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Replacements and court intrigues

Dina BajramspahićReplacements of the Head of authorities, as the act of the sanctioning due to the lack of results and serious omissions, make sense only if: those replaced are not shifted to another managerial position and secondly, even more important, if their position has been fulfilled by better, more professional and capable officials. Otherwise, the replacement does not make any changes while all the circumstances which brought to the replacement are staying “indoors”. And that’s how our practice works. Since there is not serious assessment in the state administration, the Head of authorities are usually appointed without any expert criteria, without any merits or results that would recommend them. Then, they are being replaced without any explanations, followed by appointing others in the same manner. The problems remain the same, rotating in the circle with the people who are also being rotated among different organizational unit and bodies.

Let’s start with the last example of the replacements in the Police administration. The replacements in this state body are maybe the most frequent and most confusing, since the consequences of the omissions are drastic and visible to the citizens. But does anyone really think that the new Head of the Criminal Police Sector will be more capable of his predecessor in preventing the car explosions near the kindergarten in the middle of the day? It goes without saying that someone has to be held responsible for alarming events happened in the last period of time, but the replacements will not bring the solution to the problems. The real question should be whether the causes for omissions are being treated well. If the cause is the lack of capacities in the Police, is the Strategy for managing human resources being improved? Are the missing skills being analyzed well? It is necessary to fundamentally reassess the system of salaries and the system of assessment. If we have the Police officers whose work is not being adequately evaluated and who are aware of the fact that they cannot progress based on objective merits, they will not have any interest in contributing to the service. The transparency is the key and citizens and employees need to know why is someone who is promoted better than everyone else.

On the other hand, the year 2014 ended with sudden resignation of Boro Vučinić, the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). Until today, the public did not get single serious information about what has happened. Instead, the number of the worrying assumptions about the reasons of the resignation is getting higher, which brings even more mistrust in the NSA. The reasons such as “the act of personal resignation” or “over-saturation with the job” don’t seem convincing because Vučinić didn’t wait to appoint new director, nor he officially declared his reasons of resignation in public. He neither attended the meeting of the Defense and Security Council with his resignation as the main topic of the agenda. What is of the great importance is to observe the „behaviour“ of the system in this situation. To start with, there are two hypothetical possibilities for this replacement/resignation – the Government does not need Vučinić or Vučinić does not need the Government.

The first, common assumption would be that Vučinić has made the omission, the problem or that he represents the obstacle to further reforms of the NSA, thus, the Government wants to “punish” him and appoint someone else to continue his work. In this scenario, the Government is obligated to notify the public about it because the NSA is not someone’s private company. It is unthinkable that the employees in the state administration are being appointed and replaced without the accountability toward the citizens who, in the end, pay it all. Does the silence of the Government means that it is leaving the space to appoint Vučinić to some other managerial position? In the atmosphere when the columns in newspaper are being filled with theories how the NSA is connected with the organized crime, with the Russians and whom else not, the Government with its arbitrary decisions doesn’t contribute in removing tensions.

The second theory is that Vučinić has opposed to one of the Government’s decision in regard to NSA, refused to work or continue working what was asked from him, until the differences in the opinions have reached the point of mutual exclusion. It is crucial to understand that, in this very moment, there is not the efficient institutional mechanism which would support Vučinić or any other official who does not agree with the Government’s policy. The Defense Council did not succeed to institutionally solve this problem. The Prime minister and the President have been against the decision that this topic is being discussed at all. The result of the coerced meeting has been the reduction of this question to the personal relation between Prime minister and the former Director which was meant to be discussed among them rather than treat it as the question of national importance. Although the representatives of the opposition have continued to talk about this question in the Security and Defense Committee, the parliamentary majority did not show interest in further discussion on this topic.

Whether someone likes it or not, Vučinić has given his contribution even to the reform of the Army, while he was at the Minister of Defense as well as to the reform of the NSA. The fact is that NATO standards for intelligence sector are not too high, but judging by the statements of foreign officials, the conditions they set have largely been met. From everything said, the employees in the state administration can get the following message: everyone is replaceable and irrelevant, while the results and the quality don’t mean a lot.

Every government dreams of having the unlimited power, to work whatever and however it wants and not to be held accountable, but this practice is simply unacceptable for the citizens. The challenges to the integrity, the respect for the professional standards and principles are much bigger than e.g. the risk of corruption, because the regulations are not being violated only for the personal use, but also on behalf of the state or Government. Therefore, there must be a system that reacts predictably, restricts arbitrariness and encourages professionalism.

Dina Bajramspahić
Public Policy Researcher

Text originally published in the ,,Forum” section of the daily Vijesti

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Smjene i dvorske intrige

Dina BajramspahićSmjene rukovodilaca, kao čin sankcionisanja za nedostatak rezultata i ozbiljne propuste, imaju smisla samo ako: smijenjeni nisu “pomjereni” na drugo rukovodeće mjesto; i drugo, mnogo važnije, ako su na njihovo mjesto došli bolji, profesionalniji, sposobniji službenici. U protivnom, smjena ne mijenja ništa, a sve okolnosti koje su izazvale smjenu ostaju “u kući”. I takva nam je praksa. Budući da nema ozbiljnog ocjenjivanja u državnoj upravi, rukovodioci se najčešće postavljaju bez stručnih kriterijuma, bez naročitih zasluga, bez rezultata koji ih preporučuju, potom smjenjuju bez objašenjenja, i postavljaju drugi na isti način. Problemi ostaju i vrte se u krug sa ljudima koji se takođe vrte po različitim organizacionim jedinicama i organima.

Krenimo od posljednjeg primjera smjena u policiji. U ovom državnom organu su možda i najučestalije i najkonfuznije smjene, budući da su posljedice propusta drastičnije i građanima vidljivije. Ali da li iko misli da će novi šef Sektora kriminalističke policije umjeti bolje od prethodnog da spriječi eksploziju automobila u blizini vrtića u sred bijela dana? Naravno da je neko morao da odgovora za sve alarmantno što se dešavalo u posljednje vrijeme, ali smjenama smo još daleko od rješenja problema. Pravo pitanje je da li se u dovoljnoj mjeri tretiraju uzroci za propuste. Ako se radi o nedostatku kapaciteta policije, da li se radi na Strategiji upravljanja ljudskim resursima, da li se analizira koje vještine nedostaju? Potrebno je temeljno preispitati sistem zarada, i sistem ocjenjivanja, jer policijski službenici čiji se rad adekvatno ne vrednuje, i koji su svjesni da se ne napreduje na osnovu objektivnih zasluga, nemaju interes da daju puni doprinos službi. Ključna je transparentnost, i građani i ostali zaposleni u organu moraju da znaju po čemu je unaprijeđeni bolji od svih ostalih.

Sa druge strane, 2014. godina je završena naprasnim odlaskom direktora Agencije za nacionalnu bezbjednost, Bora Vučinića. Do danas javnost nije dobila nijednu ozbiljnu informaciju o tome šta se desilo. Umjesto toga nastavljaju se umnožavati zabrinjavajuće pretpostavke o razlozima ostavke, koje unose novi talas nepovjerenja u ANB. Ne zvuči nimalo ubjedljivo da se radi o činu “lične ostavke” i “zasićenju poslom” jer Vučinić nije sačekao ni da se izabere novi direktor, nije se javno izjasnio o razlozima ostavke, a nije ni prisustvovao sjednici Savjeta za odbranu i bezbjednost na kojoj je tema bila njegov odlazak. Ono što je važno u svemu ovome je posmatrati kako se sistem “ponaša” u ovoj situaciji. Za početak, postoje dvije osnovne teorijske mogućnosti za ovu smjenu/ostavku – da Vladi više ne odgovara Vučinić, ili da Vučiniću više ne odgovara Vlada.

Prva, uobičajena pretpostavka bi bila da je Vučinić napravio propust, problem, predstavlja prepreku za reforme ANB, i Vlada hoće da ga “kazni”, i postavi drugog da nastavi njegov posao. U tom slučaju, Vlada je dužna da obavijesti javnost o tome, jer ANB nije ničija privatna firma i u državnoj upravi se ne mogu ljudi postavljati i smjenjivati bez odgovornosti prema građanima koji sve to plaćaju. Da li ćutanjem Vlada sebi ostavlja prostor da Vučinića postavi na neko drugo rukovodeće mjesto? U atmosferi kada novinske stubce pune teorije o tome da je ANB u sprezi sa organizovanim kriminalom, u sprezi sa Rusima, i kakva sve ne, Vlada svojim arbitrarnim odlukama ne doprinosi smanjivanju tenzije.

Druga teorijska opcija bi bila da Vučinić izrazio protivljenje prema nekoj od Vladinih odluka koje se odnose na ANB, da je odbio da radi, ili nastavi da radi nešto što se od njega traži, i razlike u mišljenju su dostigle nivo međusobnog isključivanja. Ključno u tome je razumjeti da, u ovom trenutku, ne postoji nijedan efikasan institucionalni mehanizam koji bi podržao Vučinića ili drugog funkcionera koji nije saglasan sa politikom Vlade. Savjet za odbranu nije uspio institucionalno da doprinese rješavanju ovog pitanja. Predsjednik Vlade i predsjednik države su bili protiv toga da se uopšte razgovara o ovoj temi. Rezultat iznuđene sjednice je svođenje ovog pitanja na, maltene, lični odnos premijera i sad već bivšeg direktora koji će oni sami da riješe, a ne državno pitanje. Iako su predstavnici opozicije najavljivali bavljenje ovim pitanjem u Odboru za bezbjednost i odbranu, parlamentarna većina takođe nije imala interesovanja da razgovara o ovome.

Sviđalo se nekome to ili ne, Vučinić je dao svoj doprinos i reformi Vojske, dok je bio na čelu Ministarstva odbrane, i reformi ANB-a. Činjenica je i da NATO standardi za obavještajni sektor nisu baš neke prezavidne visine, ali sudeći po izjavama stranih zvaničnika, uglavnom je ispunjeno to što traže. Iz ovoga slijedi poruka zaposlenima u državnoj upravi: svako je zamjenjiv i nebitan, a rezultati i kvalitet ne znače ništa.

Svaka vlada sanja da ima neograničenu moć, da radi šta hoće, kako hoće i da ne odgovara, ali je takva praksa građanima neprihvatljiva. Izazovi po integritet, poštovanje profesionalnih standarda i principa su puno veći od npr. rizika za korupciju, jer se propisi ne krše samo za lične potrebe, nego i za račun države, odnosno vlasti. Zato mora da postoji sistem koji reaguje predvidljivo, ograničava svaku samovolju i podstiče profesionalizam.

Dina Bajramspahić
istraživačica javnih politika

Tekst originalno objavljen u sekciji ,,Forum” dnevnog lista Vijesti

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Reaction: Open Calls Instead of Political Decrees

The appointment of the Assistance Ministers must not be subjected to the coalition agreements. The recruitment should be made solely on the basis of open calls and capabilities of the candidates verified by the special commission, as said from the Institute Alternative (IA).

The media announced today that one of the topic between the Heads of Forca and Democratic Party of Socialists, regarding the alleged amendments of the coalition agreement signed by these parties, will be the staffing solutions and positions in the Government, which include also the request of Forca to obtain the position of the Assistant Minister in the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights.

The Bosniak party and the Democratic Party of Socialists have signed the coalition agreement earlier, whose subject, according to the media reports, were the job positions for which the recruitment should be made in accordance to the Law and not in the accordance to the political deals.

These and similar practices of arranging jobs among the parties represents the disregard to the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees, which stipulates clear procedures for the recruitment for the position of the Assistant Minister, or the Director-General in the Ministries. Those procedures imply the previously published open call as well as the verification of capabilities, carried out by the commission established by the Human Resources Administration.

Therefore, the Director-Generals in the Ministries, or colloquially known as the Assistant Minister, although fall within a scope of the senior management staff, are still the civil servants who should be serving for the public interest rather than interests of political parties.

Unlike the Ministers and State secretaries in the ministries which are primarily political figures whose mandate is determined by the mandate of Government itself, the position of the Director-General should be fully professionalized and independent of parties in power, or, in the context of Montenegrin politics, of the relationship between powers in the ruling coalition.

Even the joint initiative of the European Commission and the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development, SIGMA, has pointed out the need of defining the positions of Director-Generals and Secretaries in the Ministries as the upper limit that separates the political and professional appointment in the state administration. Defining aforementioned upper limit is one of the “Principles of Public Administration”, published by SIGMA last year, a month after the reform of the public administration, next to the rule of law and the economic governance, was defined as one of the three main pillars of the newest EU Enlargement Strategy.

IA has warned, in its study “Professionalisation of Senior Civil Service in Montenegro: Between State and Politics” published in December 2014 with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, that the professional positions of senior management staff and the Head of authorities “on paper” are exposed to the direct political influence.

Milena Milošević
Public Policy Researcher

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Reagovanje: Javni konkursi, a ne politički dekreti

Mjesta pomoćnika ministara ne smiju da budu predmet koalicionih sporazuma, već njihova popuna treba da se vrši isključivo na osnovu javnih konkursa i provjere sposobnosti od strane posebne komisije, stav je Instituta alternativa (IA).

Mediji su objavili danas da će jedna od tema razgovora između čelnika Force i Demokratske partije socijalista povodom navodnih izmjena koalicionog sporazuma između ovih partija biti kadrovska rješenja i pozicije u vlasti, koja podrazumijevaju i zahtjev Force za mjestom pomoćnika ministra u Ministarstvu za ljudska i manjinska prava.

Bošnjačka stranka i DPS su ranije potpisale koalicioni sporazum čiji su predmet, prema medijskim izvještajima, takođe bila radna mjesta čija bi popuna trebalo da se vrši u skladu sa Zakonom a ne u skladu sa političkim dogovorima.

Ovakve prakse međupartijskog dogovaranja radnih mjesta u državnoj upravi predstavljaju obesmišljavanje Zakona o državnim službenicima i namještenicima, koji propisuje jasne procedure za popunu radnih mjesta pomoćnika ministara, odnosno generalnih direktora u ministarstvima. Te procedure podrazumijevaju prethodno objavljivanje javnog konkursa i sprovođenje provjere sposobnosti od strane komisije koju formira Uprava za kadrove.

Dakle, generalni direktori u ministarstvima, ili, kolokvijalno, pomoćnici ministara, iako, spadaju u kategoriju visokog rukovodnog kadra, su državni službenici koji treba da služe javnom interesu a ne interesima pojedinih političkih partija.

Za razliku od ministara i državnih sekretara u pojedinim ministarstvima, koji su prventstveno političke ličnosti čiji je mandat određen mandatom Vlade, pozicije generalnih direktora bi trebalo da budu u potpunosti profesionalizovane, nezavisne od smjene partija na vlasti, ili, u crnogorskom kontekstu, od međusobnog odnosa snaga u vladajućoj koaliciji.

Da bi radna mjesta generalnih direktora i sekretara u ministarstvima trebalo da predstavljaju gornju granicu koja razdvaja politička postavljenja od profesionalizovanih pozicija u državnoj upravi ukazala je i SIGMA, zajednička inicijativa Evropske komisije i Organizacije za ekonomsku saradnju i razvoj (OECD). Definisanje ove gornje granice je jedan od “principa javne uprave”, koje je SIGMA objavlila prošle godine, mjesec dana nakon što je reforma javne uprave, uz vladavinu prava i ekonomsko upravljanje, definisana kao jedan od tri glavna stuba najnovije Strategije proširenja Evropske unije.

IA je i ranije u svojoj studiji “Profesionalizacija rukovodnog kadra: Između države i politike”, objavljenoj u decembru 2014. godine uz podršku Fondacije Fridrih Ebert, upozorio da se, “na papiru” profesionalne pozicije visokog rukovodnog kadra i starješina organa, neformalnim praksama izlažu direktnom političkom uticaju.

Milena Milošević
Istraživačica javnih politika

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