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Monitoring Report: Recruitment and Promotion In State Authorities In 2014

Two years into its implementation, the contribution of the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees towards establishing a merit-based employment system in state administration has been limited due to inconsistent application of new rules and poor competition for vacancies.

The fact that very few candidates successfully pass the mandatory testing procedures for any given job position, on the one hand, and the broad interpretation of the head of state authority’s discretionary right to select from among the top five candidates, on the other hand, hardly contribute to the efforts at establishing a recruitment system that would be based on objective criteria.

Promotion of civil servants and state employees is virtually non-existent. According to available data, during the reporting period not a single decision on promotion has been passed. The legal provision that stipulates excellent results are a basis for promotion but only into a higher pay-grade is clearly not the right solution for motivating and keeping the best skilled employees.

In 2014, the number of complaints against heads of authorities’ decisions has more than doubled compared to 2013. A big portion of the complaints is against the decisions on selection of candidates, decisions on reassignment, and performance appraisal. Out of the 322 complaints and decisions that Institute Alternative has analysed, as many as 222 have been upheld, meaning more than two thirds. Most complaints were adopted due to formal mistakes by state authorities.

Transparency of the skills testing is at high level. The Human Resources Management Authority (HRMA) regularly publishes ranking lists on its website. However, it is more difficult to obtain data from state authorities, due to the high costs of accessing the information (over 500 EUR for obtaining the data required for this year’s monitoring). Of the 18 state authorities that we contacted requesting more detailed information on recruitment and promotion, only the Ministry of Defence refused to supply us with names of civil servants who were appointed to positions at this institution in the second half of 2014.

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Corruption in public procurement is all-present but difficult to prove

Shortcomings of the Law on Public Procurement, weak anti-corruption mechanisms, inadequate transparency, violation of legal norms without data on misdemeanor responsibility, and poor law enforcement capacities are key issues that create space for the corruption in public procurement.

This is the conclusion of the consultative meeting held today, which gathered the representatives of the business sector and civil society organizations to talk on the topic Mapping key risks in the area of public procurement, organized by the Institute alternative. The meeting was attended by the representatives of the Working group for development of methodology for early detection of acts of corruption in public procurement. The participant agreed that all stages of the process and all procurement of the high value are subjected to the corruption. The special part of the discussion was dedicated to the issues in the implementation of public procurement in the health services.

Participants also pointed out the weak capacities of the Inspection Directorate, the body that controls, according to new legal provisions, both procedures and public procurement contracts. Other institutions competent for this area have poor capacities, while the contract authorities usually employ only one public procurement official.

The lack of transparency is present because the Public procurement portal does not offer reliable information, while the register of the contracting authorities who violate the Law on public procurement is not publicly available. Furthermore, it is possible to monitor the area of public procurement only on annual level, since the Public procurement report is published in the end of May, while the Action plan does not define clear the indicators of the results and impact for the Chapter 23.

As pointed out, the additional problem is the unrealistic planning which can be seen in the big difference between the contracted and realized value of procurement at all enforcers of the law, as well as frequent changes to public procurement plans during one year.

They agreed that it is necessary to continue to work on strengthening the oversight role of Parliament in this area. Although the Assembly last year was intensively engaged in the area of public procurement and organized several hearings as well, their effects are poorly visible in practice.

Jovana MAROVIĆ
Research Coordinator

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Statement on Publishing the Data on Secret Surveillance Measures in Criminal Procedures

Draft Law on Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) which is now in parliamentary procedure, introduces changes to the extension of the measures of secret surveillance, the circle of persons whom these measures may apply to and the authority that can determine them.

Even though, in principle, we are not against expanding the possibilities of secret surveillance measures (SSM), because we believe that the aim is preventing the most serious offenses, we are obliged to point out that the state authorities have not made an effort to bring more accountability and transparency into this area.

After several years of application of SSM, there is not one analysis that deals with the implementation of the CPC in this area, the previous results in implementing measures or the problems in practice. Since 2012 the Institute alternative continuously warns that even the most basic data essential for the assessment of the results of the measures is not available – total of:

  • number of proposals submitted to investigative judges for the application of SSM by type,
  • number of approved proposals,
  • number of proposals for extending the measure,
  • number of cases in which SSM were applied,
  • number of proposals received and measures approved for the application of SSM by the Police Directorate,
  • number of individuals who were under SSM and the type of SSM applied,
  • number of individuals processed based on the evidence gathered via SSM,
    criminal offences of which the individuals are accused,
  • number of initiated criminal procedures on the grounds of information obtained via SSM application,
  • number of legally-binding decisions based partly on the information gathered via SSM application,
  • information about the initiated procedures of determining responsibility in cases of administrative shortcomings and unlawful procedures and misuses, especially after excluding the evidence from the court case, as well as about the controls carried out at all levels of oversight,
  • number of individuals informed about the application of SSM,
  • number of complaints of the citizens to the competent institutions on this issue, etc.

On the basis of these data, it could be reasonably argued that there is a need for Amendments initiated by the proponent of the draft. Particularly controversial is the lack of practice of determining accountability for violations of the provisions of the CPC due to which part of the collected data was exempt from court records – which means that it is not insisted on full accountability of officials who have committed violations of the provisions of the CPC in the application of MTN – although it is a criminal offense.

Regarding that, parallel with the amendments to the CPC, should initiate the amendments to the Criminal Code in order to prescribe the violations of the new measures (or the new, more precise formulations of the CPC) which require an approval of investigative judges – as a criminal offence.

When it comes to transparency, there is an uneven practice of state authorities regarding the data on how much of SSM is applied and other related data. Part of the state authorities insists on the secrecy of all the data related to the SSM, even though it is absurd for the number of the applied measures to be secret, because it certainly does not threaten the process. The other part of the state authorities does not find it necessary to even compile information on this issue.

The claim of the secrecy of the data has been disproved by the state authorities themselves, considering that the part of the data could be found in publicly available reports of the Tripartite Commission. However, it was only data for part of the applied measures for the offence of corruption and organized crime, which is not enough. Nor this kind of reporting was regularly, because some reports state that the representative of the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office did not provide information on the applied measures.

Therefore, we believe that promoting accountability and transparency are prerequisites for justified adoption of amendments related to the expansion of SSM.

The control over SSM applying in the criminal procedure should be improved, especially bearing in mind that in 2013 the report of the European Commission expert, Mauricio Varaneze has confirmed that the technical possibilities for establishing abuse are not fulfilled, retrieving data is not recorded properly and that it is “possible to misuse the entire system and avoid any control”. Since the improvement of the system requires financial resources, in the meantime it is necessary more serious reporting on the implementation and results of the implementation of the measures, the obligation that the state authorities are ignoring for years.

Dina BAJRAMSPAHIĆ
Public Policy Researcher

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Press Release in regard to the negative assessment of the cooperation of the Police and the Prosecution in the Council for National Security Report

It is devastating that the insufficiently good cooperation, lack of communication and coordination between the Police and the Public Prosecution Office remains the key problem for achieving results in the field of organized crime even five years after the Meeting of the Security and Defence Committee, dedicated to the case “Balkan Warrior”, when this problem has been ascertained.

Unfortunately, misunderstanding of the prosecutorial investigation by the large number of state prosecutors and other relevant stakeholders in our legal system, who continues to see the role of the prosecutors only in evaluating the evidence gathered by the police contributes to this problem. This has two consequences – passive and disinterested role of prosecutors during the investigation they should lead and their constant waiting for the police to do the job. On the other hand, it creates a dissatisfied police, which cannot understand what the “prosecutorial management of the investigation” consists of if they are left to do themselves. In such an atmosphere, the only thing left to both sides is to shift responsibility for the lack of the results to another side.

During 2014, Institute alternative has conducted the research on the cooperation of the Police and Prosecutor’s Office, based on 27 interviews with judges, prosecutors and police inspectors. The research has demonstrated a series of indications on the problems in practice:

  • The prosecutors are insufficiently present at the scene during the preliminary investigation and in the work with the suspects;
  • In the work of the Prosecution, there is a tendency of speeding up the investigative process at the expense of obtaining evidence;
  • The communication between the prosecutors and police officers is difficult, due to the prosecutors’ imprecise orders, and is often reduced to phone calls only;
  • Prosecutors demonstrate uneven practice in handling similar cases, as well as a lack of interest for clarifying all circumstances of the cases, which renders meaningless significant part of police officers’ work;
  • Detention for up to 12 hours and interrogation in the capacity of a citizen have significantly reduced the ability of the Police to achieve better results, especially considering the fact that the statements given before the Police bear no legal validity;
  • When there is a danger of reoffending, a court cannot order detention in the summary proceedings;
  • There is an evident lack of proactiveness and independence in the work of the prosecutors, as well as an overall closeness of the Prosecution.

Aforementioned circumstances result in an inefficient framework within which neither of the state bodies can work properly.

However, what contributes the most to the passivity of public prosecutors is the lack of practice of establishing the responsibility and sanctions for poor performance. Inflating statistics by the cases of minor social significance is being tolerated, even though many of those cases do not result in a conviction by a court decision.

Dina BAJRAMSPAHIĆ
Public Policy Researcher