Blog: One Hundred Days of the “Envelope Affair”

The envelope that contained EUR 97,000 is just the tip of the iceberg. The visible part. The part that was recorded. Others did not record similar instances. Or they are still not in the same position as DK. But we have seen plenty already in the audio and video recordings of NGOs and political parties, showing polling-day party headquarters where money is distributed, given and taken in exchange for the votes…

One hundred days have passed since the publication of the recording which showed Dusko Knezevic handing an envelope with EUR97,000 to his schoolmate Migo Stijepovic “as agreed with Milo Djukanovic”. It is time for reminders and some provisional reckoning.

What about accountability? The result of all the political, media, civil and other reactions, urges, appeals and demands is very modest – no political accountability, or criminal liability, or civil-service or ethical responsibility has been established in the course of an institutionalised process. How meaningful is the fine imposed by the Agency for Prevention of Corruption? Not really. Which political party would not go for winning the election with the help of an envelope, if the fine is equal to what the boss and his company spend on a night out?

Detail from the recording published by Duško Knežević

Where is the key protagonist? At the time, Migo Stijepovic was the Mayor of Podgorica; he was and still remains a member of the DPS Presidency, and is still Secretary General to the President of Montenegro, appointed by the President himself. He has not been dismissed (from either the party or the service), nor is he likely to be.

Everyone – apparat from the activists loyal to the regime, police officers, Anti-Corruption Agency staff or prosecutors – has been aware for decades that the money coming from tycoons and organised crime has been misused to fund DPS, mainly for vote buying.

 

The envelope that contained EUR97,000 is just the tip of the iceberg. The visible part. The part that was recorded. The others did not record similar instances.  Or they are still not in the same position as DK. But we have already seen plenty in the audio and video recordings of NGOs and political parties, showing polling-day party headquarters where money is distributed, given and taken in exchange for the votes…

That is why the whole point about the envelope case is that it is not an isolated incident, as has been suggested by Tarzan Milosevic, DPS Director, and Sreten Radonjic, Director of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption. Thus, Tarzan Milosevic, speaking in the Parliament on 21 February this year, said:” Our party President and leadership were not cognizant. This was not standard practice; this was an incident. If this proved to have been standard practice, I would leave this office the next day”.

Milo Djukanovic was much more open when he said:” This was done by many business people, including Mr. Knezevic. There is no dispute about it. It all arrived to the appropriate address at

the Democratic Party of Socialists, meaning at the DPS accounting department. It was duly recorded there, and the required reports were prepared for the purposes of the state authorities.”

Djukanovic’s statement gives rise to the conclusion that” our party President“ was quite cognizant of such transactions and that records existed of other donors and donations.

In particular given what Djukanovic said at the same press conference in February this year: “What I can tell you with certainty is that it is not true that the amount of money given was the one mentioned by Mr. Knezevic…”

This Djukanovic’s statement shows that he was well aware of the transaction. Common sense instructs us that one can either be aware of the transaction and certain of the amount agreed to be handed by Knezevic to Stijepovic, or unaware of the transaction, as Djukanovic claimed earlier, therefore also unaware of the amount.

Katnic says he has not interviewed Djukanovic ”since the facts that could be obtained by interviewing Djukanovic had been obtained otherwise”, meaning from the interview with Migo Stijepovic after he ”climbed down the chimney into the Special Prosecutor’s Office”, and the interviews conducted with his fellow party members from the DPS local committee of Zeta, and financial documents seized from the DPS local headquarters in Zeta. All that Djukanovic has said indicates that not just he, but the entire DPS party headquarters had to be interviewed  and documents seized from the very headquarters of DPS in order for the prosecution to arrive at the answer to the key question: who has been funding DPS and what amounts have been provided over the years, without any official disclosure?

Otherwise, it will be clear that the Special Prosecutor’s Office is toeing the line of DPS defence strategy, in order to establish that the “envelope” was an isolated instance, an incident or a mistake made by naïve or forgetful marginals from the party organisation who will ultimately (if at all) face sanctions which will be light, conditional and bearing no serious consequences.

What is the moral of the story? The moral is that (even the best) law on the financing of parties and campaigns is a weak instrument in tackling their cash financing. Nobody is a fool to publicly and officially admit to state institutions receiving any illicit funds. Moreover, it is certain that ”the most compliant of all the parties“, following the developments described above, will devise new mechanisms and methods to collect, distribute and conceal the “envelopes“.

This is why only a professional Special Prosecutor’s Office, applying its methods, including secret surveillance techniques and complex police-prosecutorial actions, can be successful in tackling the influence of the cash coming from (local and international) tycoons and (local and international) organised crime.

A number of people can attest that in the Spring of 2016 I personally suggested to Katnic and Ivica Stankovic an operation named ”Tape 2016“, acting on the hints that had been publicly available for years and decades and all led to the same place (DPS), in order to make sure that such practices were subject to prosecutorial investigation in the context of the 2016 election. Nothing happened in this regard, neither in the run-up nor in the aftermath of the election. This is why it is essential that the Prosecution Service is “aired”, so that the key positions can be assigned to people who are competent and ready to break the silence of the institutions and prevent the “envelopes” from impacting the 2020 election.

In the new circumstances, the Supreme State Prosecutor would prepare, on behalf of the State Prosecution Service, an Action Plan for tackling the criminal offences related to illicit financing of parties and campaigns, vote buying, which would serve as general guidance for the work of the Special Prosecutor’s Office. Anela Cekic’s forgotten diary from 2016 might serve as the basis for developing such a Plan. As part of the overall efforts towards establishing fair conditions for the election and independent Prosecution Service, the EU could provide a highly credible team of experts (from the EU member states recognised for excellence in the rule of law field) which would provide a kind of soft supervision and insight into the professionalism of the Special Prosecutor’s Office’s operation. The Supreme State Prosecutor would furnish appropriate reports on the undertaken prosecutorial actions and measures. NGOs could organise campaigns to highlight the social harm caused by the practice of vote buying, encourage resistance to such practices, support independent call centres for reporting vote buying and filing criminal complaints.

A long-term OSCE/ODIHR mission would monitor in particular the practices of illicit financing of parties/campaigns, vote buying, misuse of public funds and resources and the work of the institutions responsible for the fight against corruption and for the integrity of the electoral process.

The Agency for Prevention of Corruption, led by a new management, would implement, proactively and in a timely manner, a comprehensive range of measures and actions to identify any illicit practices, working in close cooperation with the Prosecution Service. Only such joint efforts would enable us to systematically tackle the practice that has been pushing the electoral process into lawlessness and violence and pushing the society into consecutive political crises.

Stevo Muk
President of the Managing Board

 

Monitoring the Right to Free Assembly (2017-2018)

This study aims to present how the right to peaceful assembly is exercised and respected in Montenegro. The timeframe in this report is the year 2017, although the author is referring to the year 2018 in the cases of the direct observation of the public assemblies, as well as the case studies which are necessary to present the context as a whole.

During the 2017, 304 assemblies were notified to the police. Out of that number, 18 were “temporarily banned”. This is a significantly smaller number of temporarily banned assemblies in comparison to the previous reporting period. Spontaneous assemblies are generally policed although in practice the police officers have a rigid interpretation of the article regulating these assemblies, which leaves space for dispersing them and  ling misdemeanour charges against the citizens.

Although the Ministry of Interior has announced amendments to the legislation in the beginning of 2017, no steps have been taken to publish any proposed changes. The brutal beatings of citizens during October 2015 in Podgorica still have not been investigated effectively while the identities of police officers who have beaten the citizens remain a secret.

Of great importance was a landmark decision of the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, brought on October 24th 2018, which found that by upholding the ban of gay pride march in Nikšić, the Montenegrin Supreme Court violated freedom of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed by the Article 52 of the Constitution of Montenegro, Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

New report on the Public Finance Management Reform (PFM) Programme

We have prepared a report on on the implementation of Public Finance Management (PFM) Reform Programme, which cross-refers the official data and covers some of the less studied aspects of the PFM reform.

According to the official Government reports on the implementation of the Public Finance Management (PFM) Reform Programme, one-third of the planned activities were implemented in 2017 and 2018, however, the reports do not always explain the figures provided for some of the performance indicators.

The Government of Montenegro did not comply with the budget planning timeline, and the quality of the spending units’ requests for budget allocations, which we had analysed, is not satisfactory. Out of the 19 such requests for 2018 that we covered by our review, 10 did not include any explanatory notes concerning the requested funds.

Although the Ministry of Finance (MoF) produces monthly, quarterly, bi-annual and annual reports on budget execution, in-year reporting is deprived from detailed breakdown of expenditure per institutions, key functions and programmes.

The MoF did not use the statutory possibilities to organise public discussions on the budget. The improvement of programme budget development is lagging behind. The 2019 Budget Law does not include the set of indicators for the specific number of budgetary programmes, which should have constituted the first step towards establishing programme budgeting. Project, which was supposed to bring about improved programme budgeting started implementing in late 2018. However, initial progress was made with regard to the cost estimates of strategic documents. Comparing to less than 20 per cent of strategies, adopted in 2017, which contained the overall estimate of financial means for their implementation, in 2018 this percentage increased to 46% of new strategies providing the overall financial estimate. Still, most of the challenges remain in providing precise cost estimates for implementation of all activities envisaged by strategic documents.

In addition to the selective and insufficient reporting on the execution of the overall budget, the Capital Budget transparency was at a particularly low level. Key information on the cash flows in the construction of the Bar-Boljare highway were hidden from the public. On principle, the introduction of tax and trade secrets as the grounds for restricting access to information set back the transparency of public finance.

The harmonisation of the public procurement procedures with the EU regulations was undermined by the 2017 amendments to the Public Procurement Law. The Government showcased as a major success the increase in the tax and customs revenues. However, the State Audit Institution established that the tax arrears records in early 2017 were inaccurate and underestimated the total amount by more than €15 million.

The e-registry of state property has not been established to date. The results of the State Property Inspectorate were insufficient: during 2017 and in the first half of 2018, only 32 inspections were carried out, i.e. approximately 10 per inspector. The inspections, although infrequent, point to the alarming situation of some immovable property.

The legal framework for managerial accountability and internal financial controls was partly improved. The Law on management and internal financial controls in public sector was adopted and it entered into force in November 2018. This Law more clearly defines accountability of the heads of spending units and of persons exercising delegated authority. Still, ministers are reluctant to delegate the powers to manage funds. Only two ministries provided decisions delegating some powers to the heads of the authorities subordinate to them.

The State Audit Institution adopted its new Strategic Development Plan, Guidelines for the Final Budget Account audit and Guidelines for assessing the application of the fiscal responsibility criteria. The Strategic Development Plan, however, lacks measurable objectives and performance indicators. Our review showed a relatively low share of public administration authorities covered by the audits in 2017 and 2018.

The key steps forward in the implementation of the Reform Programme materialised with regard to the preparatory activities, mainly improvements to the regulatory and strategic frameworks.

Report on the Public Finance Management Reform in 2017 and 2018: “The other side of the coin” can be downloaded here.

Report on the PFM Reform in 2017 and 2018: The other side of the coin

Public Finance Management (PFM) Reform is one of the umbrella processes intended to transform our public administration, help effective spending which would maximise the value-for-money, but also indirectly aid in the fight against corruption, as the areas most susceptible to corruption tend to be the ones where public funding intersects with private interests . The reform, as the backbone of good governance, is one of the key pillars of Montenegro’s accession to the European Union (EU).

According to the official Government reports on the implementation of the PFM Reform Programme, one-third of the planned activities were implemented in 2017 and 2018. However, the reports do not always explain the figures provided for some of the performance indicators; this Report, therefore, cross-refers the official data and covers some of the less studied aspects of the PFM reform.

The Report is divided into six key sections; with some exceptions, these largely match the key PFM reform areas. The Report covers 2017 and 2018, with the data available from the official reports of the responsible institutions mainly referring to 2017, and the indicators for the specific activities and decision-making of relevance for the PFM reform referring to both years.

The key steps forward in the implementation of the Reform Programme materialised with regard to the preparatory activities, mainly improvements to the regulatory and strategic frameworks, but public finance transparency was not improved. The recommendations included in this report provide a more detailed overview of the possible avenues for improvement based on the findings pertaining to specific areas.