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Round Table: Challenges of Developing Combined Social Policy in Montenegro – Experience of Croatia

Institute Alternative organized a round table on the topic of “Challenges of Developing Combined Social Policy in Montenegro – Experience of Croatia”. The round table is a first step in implementing the project entitled ‘Challenges of Developing Combined Social Policy in Montenegro.’

The goal of this project is to stimulate the development of combined social policy with an emphasis on developing civil society as an important actor of social reforms and decentralization of the social security system.

Prof. dr. sc Gojko Bežovan, professor at the social policy department of the Law Faculty in Zagreb, addressed the round table by introducing the experience and results of the development of social policy in Croatia.

Prof. dr. sc Gojko Bežovan is also the president of the Center for development of NGOs – CERANEO. This think-tank works on gathering, analyzing and researching problems in the area of social policy, thereby stimulating innovative approach to their resolution.

Participants of the round table included representatives of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, local self-government units, private and public institutions of social security, NGOs dealing with various social issues, UNDP and the Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognoses.

The current reform process in the social security system embraces the principles of developing social policy in general, which involve joint activities of all relevant social actors in Montenegro, their mutual cooperation and coordination, strengthening the role of local communities, privatization of social services, stimulating the development of social enterprises and engaging recipients of protective measures and social transfers, whose role in positive legislation is entirely passive.

The next phase of the project is research-based, aiming to provide an objective assessment of the level of cooperation established among all social policy actors in Montenegro, and to indicate current problems, as well as the possibilities of overcoming them. Participants of the round table gave their full support to the project and expressed their readiness to contribute to its implementation.

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Enhancing Public Administration Reform

Rationalization and modernization of the state administration must be one of the priorities in the subsequent process of accession to the EU. Last year, the process of state administration reform was characterized by the adoption of new laws. These new laws, such as the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees, are a precondition for the functioning of the state administration. However, the adoption of these laws is still insufficient to produce a genuine reorganization of the state administration apparatus in Montenegro.

In its annual progress reports, the European Commission regularly highlights the problem of an oversized administration, which is weak and politicized. Therefore, the impression is that, despite continuous reminders from Brussels, the lack of political will for providing an adequate answer to this challenge is still present in Montenegro.

While attempting to tackle the problem of an ‘oversized and dysfunctional administration’, the government of Montenegro, in its Public Administration Reform Strategy 2011 – 2016, set the adoption of European standards for employment as a strategic goal, which includes measures for reducing the number of employees with the accompanying social programs. However, the Strategy itself does not address the question of how the number of employees will be reduced without harming the efficiency of the administration. It is also worth noting that little progress has been made in the past year (since the adoption of the Strategy on 31 March 2011) in achieving this goal. An additional problem is reflected in the lack of qualified personnel, capable of dealing with greater obligations stemming from the process of European integration.

Hence, it is necessary to harmonize the performance and organization of the public administration in Montenegro with the principles operating in the framework of European administrative area. To achieve that, the system of personal advancement should be enhanced on the basis of performance. Furthermore, implementation of clear and transparent employment procedures should be strengthened. Since a credible administration is founded upon these principles, we may expect that all complex obligations, stemming from the ‘European agenda’, will have an impact on solidifying the political will, leading to real progress as regards de-politicization and rationalization of the public administration in Montenegro.

Jovana Marović
Research coordinator

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Lack of anti-corruption policy in the system of public procurement in Montenegro

Having in mind that the area of public procurement represents one of the focal points of corruption in Montenegro, the issue of tackling corruption is not adequately addressed in the Strategy for development of the public procurement system covering the period from 2011 to 2015. The Strategy, as well as the Action Plan for its implementation, foresee only two measures for the fight against corruption: signing of a cooperation agreement between the Public Procurement Administration and key anti-corruption institutions (Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, Commission for Prevention of Conflict of Interest, State Audit Institution), as well as conducting a campaign on raising public awareness about public procurement procedures. These measures are not sufficient for a successful anti-corruption policy in the coming four-year period, especially bearing in mind that the results of previous agreements between the Public Procurement Administration and key anti-corruption institutions (Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative and the Commission for Prevention of Conflict of Interest), as well as the evaluation of cooperation based on these agreements, are not known yet.

That is why it is particularly important to concretise the measures for the fight against corruption and define them according to the risks of corruption emergence in various phases of the public procurement procedure. Crucial risks for corruption emergence exist in the planning phase already, in the preparation of tender documents, during the conduct of public procurement procedure, as well after concluding an agreement on public procurement.

New Law on Public Procurement, which entered into force on 1 January 2012, contains certain provisions that are better compared to the previous legal framework, especially in the field of: public procurement planning; conditions for participation in the procedure; defining the subject of public procurement, etc. However, three months after the entry into force of the new Law on Public Procurement, it is still impossible to evaluate the extent of its implementation.

Finally, it is possible to note that the 2012 Public Procurement Plan of most purchasers still contains the total value of public procurement and the planned procurement budget according to the subject type (goods, works, services), while it does not contain a timeframe for the launching of the procedure and the position in budget, as prescribed in a bylaw regulating the public procurement plan, whose implementation has started by the entry into force of the new Law on Public Procurement on 1 January 2012.

Milica Popović, M. Sc.
Policy Researcher, Institute Alternative

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Interview for Balkan Insight: Jovana Marović – Research Coordinator

Following her appointment as an NGO representative in the working group for chapter 23 in the process of negotiations for accession to the EU, Jovana Marović, research coordinator at Institute Alternative, had an interview with Balkan Insight on 12 March 2012

1. How many non-governmental organizations applied to have their representatives included in the working groups?

Chief negotiator underlined at the press conference that 10 applications for participation in the working groups on chapters 23 and 24 were submitted by NGOs.

2. What will be your individual role, as a representative of Institute Alternative? What issues will you insist on?

Institute Alternative, through its research activities, has been closely involved in areas particularly susceptible to corruption: public procurement; public-private partnerships; issues directly linked to planning and executing the budget at local and national level; operation and reform of state and local administration. During its continuous work in these areas, the Institute issued numerous publications, analyses, comments, and formulated numerous proposals and recommendations for practical policies, many of which were incorporated in final versions of normative acts. Hence, my role in the working group for negotiations for accession to the EU, as a representative of Institute Alternative, is reflected in contributing to the area of fight against corruption, especially in the fields which are the Institute’s expertise.

3. In case you know, based on which criteria were you and other 5 representatives chosen?

As I mentioned in answering your previous question, my appointment is grounded in my hitherto work for Institute Alternative in areas covered under chapter 23, as well as in my academic and professional credentials which are in the framework representing an integral part of this chapter (rights of EU citizens).

4. Is it true that this is the first time that NGO representatives participate in a candidate country’s negotiations with the EU? Why is that? Whose initiative was it?

Non-governmental sector participated in previous negotiations, albeit less and in a not so formal way. However, this is the first time it participates directly in the working groups. This inclusion of the NGO sector is contingent upon the complexity of the negotiating process itself, but also upon the lack of administrative capacities in state institutions which requires ‘external’ expert contribution.

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Inquiry, a parliamentary one!

Parliamentary majority should realize that parliamentary inquiry, like other mechanisms of overseeing the government, is a good opportunity for the government itself to reaffirm and present its policies with arguments, before MPs and the public

Decision to conduct the first parliamentary inquiry since the restoration of independence, has been made. A second one – the first was the one in which ‘Nacional’ wrote about tobacco smuggling and the involvement of the same guy suspected of being at the heart of ‘Telekom’ affair.

We are pleased that such a decision was made and we believe that conducting it has a significant potential for enhancing the parliamentary oversight in Montenegro. At this moment, it is less important how this decision was made and what was at stake in the political game. The role of SDP is of the greatest importance in launching the mechanisms of parliamentary oversight, which we pointed to even earlier, and that proved to be the case now, too. We would be pleased if the repeated calls of Institute Alternative and other non-governmental organizations contributed at least a bit to the opening of this parliamentary inquiry.

Earlier on, we used to indicate that the constitutional possibility of proposing and conducting parliamentary inquiry had been virtually unused in Montenegro. This control mechanism has not been carried out in the past ten years, and since the adoption of the existing Rulebook of the Parliament, which regulates the question of parliamentary inquiries, only twice was their launching proposed.

In Montenegro, there used to be a lack of political will of the parliamentary majority to initiate parliamentary inquiries, as well as the opposition’s lack of confidence about the possibility of their conduct. Besides, the opposition did not act in unison when initiating this mechanism in the past.

During the parliamentary inquiry, the inquiring committee could face the difficulty of gathering data because of: imprecisely defined investigative authority; impossibility of accessing secret data; absence of legal requirement for state officials, civil servants and other persons to be interrogated before the Committee, with the threat of sanction for the contempt of court or false testimony. Unlike in Montenegro, where parliamentary inquiries are regulated by the Rulebook, in a great number of EU member states, they are regulated by law – most frequently by a special law on parliamentary inquiry.

Determining a special legal framework for this control mechanism aims at its strengthening, as well as guaranteeing absolute requirement to respect all the provisions regulating it. Adoption of such a law in Montenegro would regulate the specificities of the inquiring committee’s sphere of competence, as well as criminal provisions, which would allow for an adequate application of this mechanism in practice.

Parliamentary inquiries are ‘suitable’ for examining a problem bearing a political dimension, because the consequences this control mechanism ‘produces’ are primarily political. An important goal of conducting parliamentary inquiries is, therefore, to determine the political responsibility of state bodies, but also the tendency to provide a systemic response to a social problem which triggered the launching of the inquiry.

Such goals of the parliamentary inquiry are achieved by granting the inquiring committees / investigative commissions undertaking them, a special authority, greater than the one granted to ‘permanent’ committees in the parliament.

For instance, in Italy and Portugal, the commission for inquiry has the same authority and restrictions at its disposal as the judicial bodies conducting the investigative work. Such greater authority is actually of investigative nature and is related to data gathering, witness interrogation, and requesting submission of data significant for the investigation.

Provisions regulating the conduct of criminal procedure may be applied during data gathering, as is the case in Germany, while in Denmark the Minister of Justice may appoint a special investigator who participates in gathering evidence during the investigation. A significant number of European countries have a special law on parliamentary inquiries. In countries where such a law does not exist, this control mechanism is regulated by other laws, in order to respond to the inquiring committee’s requests efficiently.

For a more frequent conduct of parliamentary inquiry, change in parliamentary majority is needed, as well as more intensive and cohesive demands of the opposition and the public. Parliamentary majority should understand that parliamentary inquiry, like other mechanisms of overseeing the government, is a good opportunity for the government itself to reaffirm and present its policies with arguments, before the MPs and the public.

By rejecting the opposition request to use the oversight mechanisms, parliamentary majority contributes to the impression that it wants to hide the facts that are not in its favor. On the other hand, before snatching the parliamentary inquiry, the parliamentary opposition should use its ‘softer’ MP rights in their full capacity. It is possible that some sort of a political agreement, allowing the opposition to launch a parliamentary inquiry at least once a year or once during each convocation, would finally make this mechanism of parliamentary oversight a reality.

While conducting the parliamentary inquiry, it is expected that many obstacles and limitations in the legal framework will emerge. Parliamentary inquiries need to be legally regulated, through a special Law on parliamentary inquiries, which would define the sphere of competence of the inquiring committee, its formation, organisation, operation, budget, way of conducting the investigation, way of reporting to the Parliament.

By defining the authority for investigation based on the model of criminal procedure, the inquiring committee would benefit from more reliable methods of obtaining information. The law should include criminal provisions which would relate to the failure to deliver information, failure to respond to a witness invitation, or for false testimony.

By approving a special budget to the inquiring committee, it is necessary to ensure autonomy and independence of its work. Amendments to the Information Secrecy Act should foresee the availability of secret data to the inquiring committee of the Parliament, in charge of the parliamentary inquiry.

Constitutional amendments should reduce the number of MPs needed to submit a proposal on launching the parliamentary inquiry. The goal is to allow for a greater number of initiatives and to have more frequent public votes on the initiatives of general public importance, which is a good comparative practice.

Stevo Muk
President of the Managing Board of Institute Alternative