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Parliament of Montenegro and the process of European integration – Just watching or taking part?

After it acquired the status of a candidate for membership in the European Union on 17 December 2010, Montenegro officially began the process of fulfilling the preconditions for the next phase of integration into this supranational body – the accession negotiations. However, in its Opinion on Montenegro’s membership application, the European Commission made the beginning of accession talks conditional upon progress in sever priority areas which require extensive harmonisation with membership criteria. The first concerned the Parliament, and, in addition to the adoption of new electoral legislation, it asked for the strengthening of oversight and legislative roles of the Parliament of Montenegro.

Taking from the thus identified need to strengthen Montenegro’s legislative body for the process of European integrations, this study first summarises the general role of the Parliament in the pre-accession phase, as well as in the period after formal accession to European Union. The introductory section also analyses the role and capacities of the Parliament’s working body which is currently in charge of European integrations – Committee for International Relations and International Relations, as well as those of the National Council for European Integrations. The analysis provides an overview of their work to date, including membership, capacities, competencies, and cooperation with the civil society. Focusing on these aspects of their work, and offering an account of their activities so far, as well as insights into practice of similar bodies in other countries of the region and in European Union, we will outline the possible solutions and alternative institutional arrangements, bearing in mind the Montenegrin context, demands of the European integration process, as well as the exigencies of financial and administrative effectiveness. The goal of the study is to offer a snapshot of the current capacities and responsibilities of the parliamentary bodies which are to play a role in the accession process, and to outline solutions grounded in comparative practice that could contribute to an improved position of these bodies.

In the course of our research we conducted interviews with the representatives of the Parliament, as well as with the State Secretary for European Integrations in the Government of Montenegro. Their opinions were extremely valuable in helping us to identify the current position and capacities of the Parliament and its bodies in the process of Montenegro’s integration into EU. As the study also took into account the future role of the National Council for European Integrations, we also interviewed its members who are not representatives of the Parliament. We also sent a number of requests for access to information to the Office of the Secretary General of the Parliament, which provided the basis for the overview of the functioning of these two bodies. The final section offers recommendations for each of the areas analysed in this report.

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Law on Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Defense Sector – First Year of Implementation

2011 Monitoring Report

The Law on Parliamentary Oversight of Defense and Security Sector was unanimously adopted by the Parliament of Montenegro in December 2010, after nearly three years since the conception of idea of the need for its adoption.

The basic objective of the Law was to enable the Parliament of Montenegro, directly through the Committee for Defense and Security conducting the oversight of authorities in charge of security and defense, to ensure the protection of citizens’ freedoms and rights against possible abuse, as well as to contribute to the development of a comprehensive and modern security system of Montenegro.

The Law specifies the manner of conducting parliamentary oversight of actions of authorities and institutions dealing with the security and defense issues, their duties, as well as the relationship of the Committee for Defense and Security to the Parliament and Government of Montenegro.

The authors of this paper endeavored in providing an objective and comprehensive overview of the work of both the Parliament and the Committee for Defense and Security in 2011, being important as the first year of implementation of the Law on Parliamentary Oversight of Defense and Security Sector. The scope of this paper is not limited to the numbers and statistical data, and it simultaneously represents an overview of meeting the key competences defined by the Law and Rules of Procedures of the Parliament. Furthermore, the objective of the paper is to underline the problems encountered in the parliamentary oversight functioning, as well as to emphasize that the Law has failed in thoroughly addressing certain issues that the authors of this paper have raised during its development.

With this paper, the Institute Alternative aims at strengthening the discussion and public dialogue tradition in reference to the work of the Committee for Defense and Security and, generally, the functioning of the parliamentary oversight of the defense and security sector.

This is the first in a series of annual reports through which we will endeavor in developing the oversight methodology of both the Parliament and the Committee in reference to this issue, benchmarking the fulfillment of the legal provisions, and finally to assist in the process of planning the parliamentary oversight performance.

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We can, if we must!

“Without exaggeration, I think that our judiciary made a significant step forward in relation to the region and give us a starting position in a future accession negotiations, much better than the positions of some other countries,” said Deputy Prime Minister Duško Marković in a recent interview for national newspapers. Two days later, President of the Hungarian Supreme Court almost repeats his words, adding that he greatly desires that his own country is “be able to proud itself on the same achievements as Montenegro”.

The agony of the police, prosecution and judiciary in the most visible cases tells a significantly different story about the condition of these institutions – a story quite different from the one told by the state officials. One head, a x-ray scan of different one – the Son who they do not dare to put in the detention unit – husband and father, who disappeared and who no one mentions – continued police prosecution of “whistleblowers” – a judge who gets pally with the indicted – a judge that doesn’t dare to tell the accused Son that he is accused – president of the court assigns the same cases to himself – judge who relieves the accused public official of guilt because he is a prominent citizen, and the local government he damaged doesn’t care to sue him – a number of persons from Interpol’s warrants being lost without trace, etc., etc.

If this happens in cases which are under constant media attention, what is in store for an ordinary citizen, who doesn’t have the influence of the persistent and intense public pressure?

We can only assume. If judges act this way in cases which are under constant media attention, what happens in the everyday trials? If this is the behavior of healthcare workers and police officers in cases associated with domestic and international factors, what awaits common people? This “independence” is not automatically cured by changes to the constitution or Marković’s claims that the public, “…mistakenly perceives that there is political influence on judicial organs – that some politicians are asking the judges to bring verdicts according to their wishes. It has not been confirmed that such cases exist, nor has there been any reported cases.”

Gerald Knaus, director of the European Stability Initiative, recently in response to a reporter’s question about the fight against organized crime, said: “You can see everything trough the case of Croatia. The biggest arrest in this field happened in Croatia in the last two years. Therefore, this scenario would be expected in other countries of the region”. This fact faithfully followes the logic of the Government – we will do everything you say, when we have to. The Government has always conducted reforms following the principle – Change only as much as you need, when you need to. That is why we experience a combination of real reform and simulations, where the ration between the real and the rhetorical is determined by the pressure that comes from the EU.

This is why those who are more informed claim that recently someone from the top said “Enough! No need to investigate, arrest, charge and accuse any more”. In other words, “See you next year” or even better, “See you in the last two years before accession.” Marković says: “In Montenegro there is no direct connection between the authorities, politics and crime. It is also true that we have organized crime, largely as a consequence of developments in the region over the past two decades.” In other words, organized crime in Montenegro, in contrast to all other countries in the region, in the EU and the whole world, has no relationship with the government and the politics. Hardly the case.

Deputy Prime Minister Marković, asked about the fight against corruption, says: “Unlike organized crime, I think we have poor performance in combating corruption with the hard work still ahead.” This is a more honest approach of Government – but how much worse is this compared to the “strong” results in the fight against organized crime, judge for yourself. Marković is wrong when he says that our biggest problem is in the perception or our experience of reality. However, he correctly adds that: “…it is the issue of results and confidence in the institutions…” The experience is created by results, and the results are achieved by strong institutions – this way of things will also change our experience. Not the opposite.

However, there is no doubt that the further we are in the process of European integration, the less will we be able to simulate the reforms. Provided we get the date of the negotiations (which is now realistic, partly because of what Montenegro did, but mostly because of what other countries in the region didn’t do), an entirely different, qualitatively new process and relation with the EU is waiting for us. The real work is still ahead, first through the preparation for negotiations, and later the negotiating process. I hope that the toughest and most demanding chapters will be opened first. Yet, even this process is not perfect nor can we measure everything objectively. Some things will be measured based on perceptions, ours in Montenegro and those in Brussels. Finally, we should not forget that the final decisions in the European integration process are political or at least influenced by political factors.

Stevo Muk
President of Institute Alternative’s Managing Board

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Control of the local self-governments’ budget

The annual expenditure of local self-governments exceeds 250 million Euros.

Having in mind the annual amount of local self-government expenditure in Montenegro, adequate oversight of planning, execution and audit of local budgets is indisputably significant.

In order to provide an overview of the existing mechanisms for budgetary oversight at the local level, this analysis will offer an overview of both the legal framework and the practice of planning, execution and audit of local budgets in four selected Montenegrin municipalities: Nikšić, Danilovgrad, Podgorica and Herceg Novi.

The annual budget execution statements of Nikšić, Danilovgrad and Herceg Novi municipalities were audited by the State Audit Institution (SAI). This was the reason for the selection of these cases for this research, as it will help us to determine how SAI reports help to improve budgetary oversight.

The capital City Podgorica has been selected in light of several issues: the amount of budgetary resources, the amount of resources allocated for capital investment, and the numerous debates reported by the media in relation to Podgorica’s budget.