Public administration reform

The Government of Montenegro adopted Draft Agenda for Public Administration Reform in Montenegro for the period 2010-2014, entitled “Aurum”, in the end of June. It was put to public hearing and it is expected that the final text of the Strategy, together with the Action Plan for its implementation will be adopted by the end of September. These documents should provide a continuation of the process, which was begun by adopting the Administrative Reform Strategy for the period 2002-2009.

It is positive that the process of drafting a new strategy has been intensified since the beginning of the year and that relevant organizations and institutions, both domestic and international, have been included in process. Particularly important is the goal presented in the Draft, to adopt the laws on Ministries and other administrative bodies, civil service and public agencies. This is in accordance with the new Constitution of Montenegro, which provided that the Assembly of Montenegro is in charge of regulating the state administration system. Further, the reforms envisaged in the field of inspection service control are one of the straightforward places in the Draft. The problems are clearly defined, and measures are appropriate and specific. We should also point out the positive intention to “form a single body for inspection control”. The need for considering this option was indicated in the earlier studies of Institute Alternative.

Although the Draft strategy represents a solid basis for further work, it is obvious that its authors did not possess a serious analysis of the results of implementing the earlier Strategy. This fact is not the result of their negligence, but rather the result of the general condition of the public administration and its weak analytical capacities. In the preparation of analysis and information, state administration bodies almost exclusively outline positive aspects of the process and its products, rather than issues, failures, their causes and consequences. Although participation and orientation of public administration toward citizens and legal entities has been promoted as a principle, the approach in preparing the analysis show that the possibility of using feedback, information, opinions and attitudes obtained from the users of services themselves has not been used. For example, the substantiality and the types of information presented in the Analysis of implementing public administration reform (2007) and Information on the implementation of public administration reform (2009) are such that they can not serve as a good basis for work on a new strategy. In these documents, there is no clear and precise data on realized, partially realized and unrealized measures from the earlier strategy and action plan, nor on the achievement of goals and objectives of the earlier strategy.

Thus, although the first of eight key goals of administrative reform was defined as “substantial transfer of powers to the lower levels, achieving a higher degree of flexibility of the entire administrative system”, the Draft did not give any answers to fundamental questions of content and dynamics of these reforms. The strategy requires a clearer definition in this section.

Among other things, the Draft anticipates rationalization of the number of employees in public administration as one of the major tasks, but fails to sufficiently explain the principles on which this tedious task will rest, as well as responsibility for implementation of this process. In a situation where there are no clear criteria for admission and promotion of civil servants, it is questionable whether and to what extent the process of reducing the number of employees can be based on objective criteria and requirements.

The Draft notes the need for “further development of the system of disciplinary responsibility”. It explains that “effective public administration implies greater individual responsibility of officials and employees in achieving the set goals,” and that the goal set forth is “accountability of public administration to other administrative, legislative or judicial authority, which is aimed at ensuring respect for the rule of law.” However, specific problems in this field are not identified, nor have strategic directions for their solution been defined.

If the Government wants the public administration reform strategy to be applicable and functional, then the key problems in current functioning of public administration must be clearly identified and strategic goals and objectives defined. Only on the basis of such a strategy, it is possible to prepare high-quality action plan, which will contain precise measures, timelines and responsibilities. Mutual relations (hierarchy, coherence, coordination and monitoring) of this Strategy and other Government’s strategic documents dealing with issues of importance to public administration should be resolved within the framework of this Strategy. Also, it is important that the strategy fully recognizes and correctly anticipated the needs of public administration in the process of European integration. That is why it is important to harmonize the Strategy and the National Plan for Integration of Montenegro into the European Union (NPI). Of importance to the success of the Strategy is also that the division of political coordination, operational activities and advisory roles is functional and a subject of full consensus in the Government. Last but not least, the Government should determine the amount of public funds for the implementation of the Strategy and thus further confirm the commitment to this process. Dynamics of the reform should not depend on the success of raising funds from foreign sources.

Stevo Muk
President of the Managing Board

ANB has an obligation towards the public

Law on National Security Agency (ANB) provides that the session of the Parliamentary Committee that will discuss its annual report for 2009 is completely closed for public.

However, there is no valid reason that most of the aforementioned report on the work of ANB is made available to the public. This includes disclosure of information in principle, evaluations and opinions. No information on specific individuals, actions or details of operational nature is needed to be disclosed, since this data must remain secret so it does not hamper the work of ANB.

The public should, however, be informed about the key threats to national security, which is the practice of relevant security services.

Also, the public should be familiar with the number of prosecuted cases in which the data collected by the ANB helped in investigating criminal offenses related to organized crime and corruption. In this regard, it is especially important to reveal information about the secret surveillance measures implemented and their results. It is in the public interest to have information about the work of the ANB Inspector General available. This is particularly important in the context of earlier allegations about political and economic activities of individual officers of ANB, and their connections with individuals marked as ‘interesting’ in terms of security affaires.

Since ANB has earlier made parts of its annual reports available through requests for free access to information, there is no reason to make them publicly available immediately after the session of the Parliamentary Committee when the full report will be presented in secret.

A significant step forward in public relations and building confidence in the work of ANB would be a press conference at which the Head of ANB would present those parts of ANB’s annual report for which there cannot be justification for keeping them secret.

Capacity building of the Parliamentary service

Capacity building of the Parliamentary service should be the subject of a long-term plan, grounded on real needs of the committees and parliamentarians. The analysis of Institute Alternative published in January this year, concludes that, although there is a will to increase the number of employees in the Parliamentary service, personnel policies and deployment of new employees do not equally meet the needs of all parties and committees.

Larger number of officers directly responsible for providing services to members of the committees on certain topics is essential for greater focus on parliamentary debate in the committees. This is particularly important in relation to the exercise of the Parliament’s control function.

Parliamentary service should be freed of personnel with inadequate capacities for meeting obligations in the process of EU integration. However, this has to be done in a planned and gradual manner.

Hiring new employees must be based on objective criteria of competence and knowledge, freed from the party affiliation criterion. There are serious objections that the hitherto admission of new employees has been based on biased, political criteria. This seriously impairs the long-term prospects of the Parliament building a professional and expert service.

Additionally, Parliamentary service cannot be predominantly based on trainees. It should develop mechanisms to attract experienced and qualified personnel from other institutions and sectors. In this sense, the Parliament has no excuse for the absence of funds for these needs, because it has the final say in adopting the state budget.

The possibility of committees to hire paid staff (secretary and a number of consultants), from its own party structures should not be a substitute for the professional Parliamentary service.

The whole human resource management should be placed in the jurisdiction of the Parliament. Full participation of all parties in monitoring of legality and objectivity of the process should be enabled.

In the process of establishing a more numerous, competent and more professional Parliamentary service, possibilities of cooperation with civil society organisations independent experts should be significantly more utilized.

The Assessment of Legal Framework and Practice in the Implementation of Certain Control Mechanisms of the Parliament of Montenegro