During the public consultation process, we submitted comments to the Ministry of Finance on the Draft Law on Amendments to the Public Procurement Law. We raised concerns regarding the proposed abolition of the Public Procurement Inspection and highlighted the insufficient capacity of the Budget Inspection to oversee contract implementation. We called for extending anti-corruption measures to simple and direct procurement, introducing sanctions for misdemeanours in this area, and improving reporting on market research.
The Draft Law introduces clearer definitions of corruption in public procurement, introduces mandatory market analysis – which was one of our earlier recommendations – and envisages strengthened control over contract implementation. However, it also contains certain amendments that may prove problematic in practice.
We proposed that supervision over the implementation of the Law continue to be carried out through public procurement inspectors, in accordance with both the Public Procurement Law and the law governing inspection oversight. The Draft effectively envisages abolishing the Public Procurement Inspection, transferring its responsibilities to the Ministry of Finance, without specifying that such oversight will be inspection-based and conducted in line with the systemic law regulating inspection supervision.
We welcome the intention to create legal preconditions for better oversight of contract implementation. However, in our comments on the Draft, we stressed that introducing additional competences requires amendments to the Law on Budget Inspection, which currently assigns this inspection authority over four systemic laws. We expressed concern that new responsibilities are being added despite the inspection’s limited capacity to perform its existing mandate. Of the eight inspector positions foreseen in the systematisation, only two are currently filled, while one additional inspector conducts controls based on special authorisation. With such limited capacity, the inspection has planned only ten inspections in 2026. It is therefore particularly concerning that, due to insufficient capacity, effective oversight of contract implementation as envisaged by the Draft may prove unfeasible. We also emphasised the need to improve the reporting framework on contract implementation to ensure meaningful supervision.
We oppose the proposed removal of the provision under which a bid exceeding the estimated value of the procurement is considered irregular. The estimated value determines the type of procedure and the application of statutory thresholds. Allowing acceptance of bids that significantly exceed the estimated value, without clear limitations, could encourage the practice of formally setting lower estimated values in order to apply simpler procedures, while subsequently “adjusting” the actual contract value by accepting higher bids. The removal of this safeguard is particularly problematic given that market analysis is being introduced as mandatory, implying that the estimated value must be realistically and professionally determined based on objective market indicators.
We also proposed extending anti-corruption measures to simple procurement, which are regulated by a separate by-law. We particularly highlighted direct procurement, where the risk of conflict of interest is higher due to the absence of competitive procedures. We supported this proposal with a concrete case of inspection oversight that we initiated, which did not result in a finding of irregularities because the law did not prescribe conflict-of-interest safeguards for direct procurement. Furthermore, we called for the introduction of misdemeanour sanctions for irregularities in simple procurement, as the current law does not provide sanctions for violations in this segment.
Although the Draft introduces mandatory market research prior to initiating a procurement procedure, it does not specify the form of reporting. We proposed introducing an obligation to publish a report on the conducted market research and requiring the Ministry to define its mandatory content. This would ensure that contracting authorities report on market analyses in a consistent and comparable manner.
We also proposed clearly prescribing that a public procurement commission must consist of at least three members. In addition, we noted that the provision granting preference to the earliest submitted bid in case of equal scoring only makes sense if the bids are fully equal across all individual evaluation criteria.
Dragana Jaćimović