On Friday, May 31st, we met with representatives of the Committee on Economy, Finance, and Budget, as well as representatives of the Parliamentary Budget Office.
During the meeting, we presented the new section of the javnenabavke.mojnovac.me, portal related to public procurement, as well as the results of our research on budget transparency.
We also discussed our initiatives and findings from the monitoring of this Committee, and we provided recommendations for improving the Committee’s further work.
While awaiting the report from the public hearing, we highlight important suggestions we submitted to the Ministry of Public Administration on the Draft Law on Amendments to the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees.
In light of announcements of more complex amendments, we limited our suggestions to the current scope of changes, although we believe that a fundamental reform in this area is necessary to address numerous priorities: from the inappropriately narrow scope of regulations regarding civil servants and state employees, to the scope of human resource planning and transparency in job allocation and filling.
We regret to note that our active contribution within the working group has not been valued, given that we received no feedback on previously submitted comments, despite the general assessment that they were “constructive comments.” Furthermore, there was no explanation for the minimal duration of the public hearing, without holding a round table, for which we were also left without in the working group.
We submitted a total of ten suggestions with comprehensive explanations, based on decades of research and monitoring.
Regarding the norms regulating experience for leadership positions, it is necessary to add a norm that specifies that such experience is proven by reviewing the previous relevant employment contract. Additionally, to strengthen inspection oversight, which is a greatly neglected area, we suggest the necessity of enhancing the analytical capacities of inspection bodies, which are currently exceptionally weak. Such a norm would allow individuals who have performed the most complex inspection oversight tasks to contribute in the same area where they possess relevant experience.
Regarding the provision regulating the status of employees in the Administrative Centre, whose establishment is foreseen through amendments of mentioned law, we believe that employees in this institution should not be exempt from the application of the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees, especially since it plays a significant role in setting an example in this area.
The narrow scope of regulations regarding civil servants and state employees is one of the main issues in public administration employment, which is further complicated by such provisions. We remind that even agencies, with full implementation, apart from a few, should apply the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees, while this Law is already applied to employees in the Ombudsman Institution and the State Audit Institution. The explanation that state commissions would be in a conflict of interest while reviewing complaints or procedures against employees in this institution simply does not hold, as such a broad interpretation could extend to relations with other institutions.
We also suggested that the Law, in principle, should prescribe criteria for assessing unprofessional and negligent performance of duties, which would be further elaborated by a by-law, in relation to the dismissals of members of state commissions that occurred for these reasons. In the articles relating to the appointment of members of state commissions, one of the conditions for appointment should be that the candidate cannot be a member of a political party.
The Open Budget Survey, which has been conducted since 2006, included Montenegro for the first time this year, ranking it among 125 countries in terms of budget openness.
On the transparency index, Montenegro scored 48 out of a possible 100 points, indicating significant shortcomings in access to budget data. With this result, Montenegro ranks 64th out of 125 countries. In the region, only North Macedonia (35 points) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (27 points) scored worse than us – all other countries in the region are ahead of Montenegro in this regard.
This part of the Index measures the public availability of information on how the executive branch collects and spends public resources. The survey assesses the availability, timeliness, and comprehensiveness of eight key budget documents, using 109 indicators to measure budget transparency and assign each country a score on a scale from 0 to 100. A transparency score of 61 or higher indicates that a country publishes enough material to inform the public and prepare for public budget discussions.
In other dimensions of the survey, Montenegro achieved mixed results. Public participation in budgeting was particularly poorly rated, with 13 out of 100 points, while budget oversight was rated as adequate (74 out of 100 points), although the role of the Parliament in this regard was rated significantly lower than that of the State Audit Institution.
Creating a citizens’ budget, providing a mid-year budget execution report to Parliament, publishing non-financial data on budget performance, achieving goals and indicators of the program budget, and mechanisms for involving citizens in the budget process are just some of the recommendations that need to be fulfilled for Montenegro to improve its score.
Institute Alternative is the local partner that conducted this research for Montenegro, under the auspices of the International Budget Partnership from Washington.
The observed period of work of the Parliament of Montenegro was marked by numerous political crises that also affected the activities of the working bodies. Despite the dissolution of the Parliament and a no-confidence motion against the Government, the practice of debating legislative proposals that do not meet basic public criteria has continued.
In the period from the dissolution of the Assembly to the formation of the new, 28th convocation, as many as 27 legislative proposals were submitted to the parliamentary procedure, 18 of which were proposed by the Government, while 9 were submitted by members of parliament. The dynamic period that affected the work of the Parliament of Montenegro also affected its working bodies, so the committees mostly worked without adopted work plans, which made it difficult to assess the realisation of their activities.
In this analysis, we provide a cross-section of the work of five parliamentary committees: Committee for Political System, Justice, and Administration, Committee for Security and Defense, Committee for Human Rights and Freedoms, Committee for Anti-Corruption, and Committee for Economy, Finance and Budget, in the period from October 2022. until October 2023.
Numerous problems that were observed in the earlier periods of the committee's work continued in this one as well, such as the holding of hearings that are not accompanied by appropriate reports with conclusions and recommendations, the failure to adopt reports on the work of institutions without recommendations for their improvement and the adoption of legal amendments without discussion...
The Draft Law on Amendments to the Law on Inspection Supervision was submitted to the Parliament on May 8 through an urgent procedure, without conducting a public debate.
Institut alternativa has provided suggestions to the Legislative Committee and the Committee on Political System, Judiciary, and Administration, urging members to propose amendments to improve the Draft Law on Amendments to the Law on Inspection Supervision.
We reached out to the members of Parliament because the Government submitted the Draft Law for parliamentary procedure on May 8 through an urgent procedure, without conducting a public debate. No roundtable was held on the proposal, so we were unable to provide suggestions and recommendations on the text of this law, which has been under revision since 2017, when the last public debate was held.
A key change in the systemic framework is the proposal to establish a Coordinating Body for Harmonisation and Monitoring of Inspection Supervision, as a permanent working body of the government that, among other things, “coordinates the work of all inspection bodies.” The powers of the Coordinating Body for Harmonisation and Monitoring of Inspection Supervision, as outlined in the draft law, significantly exceed the nature and objectives of the powers of permanent working bodies stipulated by the Regulation on the Work of the Government. Permanent working bodies of the government include: the Commission for Political System, Internal and Foreign Policy; the Commission for Economic Policy and Financial System; the Commission for Personnel and Administrative Matters; and the Commission for the Distribution of Part of the Budget Reserve Funds.
Suggestions for improving the legal text result from IA’s monitoring of the work of inspections. Analysis “How Do Inspections Operate? – Overview of the Work of Seven Inspections in Areas at Risk of Corruption” is available on the IA website. Monitoring, which covered seven different inspections, showed that the role of inspections in the fight against corruption is underdeveloped, particularly evident in the lack of a unified strategic approach and a well-developed legal framework. The proposed legal amendments do not address the identified shortcomings, such as inconsistent supervision planning, risk assessment based on standardised methodology, and handling of initiatives.
We pointed out to the members of Parliament that it is necessary to clarify methodology and procedure for harmonising the annual work plans of different inspections and that the annual work plan should include a detailed plan for joint/coordinated inspections. Additionally, the procedure for harmonising plans needs to be specified.
Furthermore, we noted that the article relating to risk assessment does not specify whether a standardised methodology is involved, and it is unclear whether each inspection body independently develops its methodology or if it is adopted solely at the ministry level. The possibility of establishing an obligation to prepare and adopt standardised guidelines for developing the methodology (for risk assessment and ranking) should also be considered.
We believe it is necessary to stipulate that an inspection body, or a legal entity, is required to develop an internal procedure for handling initiatives, defining deadlines and procedures, and making it available to the public, i.e., proactively publishing it on the website. If an inspection is not responsible for handling a received initiative, it must promptly, or within a specified timeframe, forward the initiative to the competent inspectorate.
We also suggested making the preparation of checklists mandatory, as the current draft leaves them as an option rather than a requirement, and that the Coordinating Body should prepare guidelines for creating a general form of inspection supervision reports.
We reminded the members of Parliament that, in addition to this Draft Law, the Government also submitted a Draft Law on Amendments to the Laws Regulating Inspection Supervision, that proposes changes to as many as 82 laws. We criticised the Government for rushing the change in the inspection supervision model without prior analysis of the situation, contrary to the public administration framework, which the Institut alternativa has repeatedly pointed out.
We have repeatedly reacted to the fact that the Government initiated a serious reform based on the conclusions from the 2021 Analysis of the Efficiency of the Inspectorate Administration, neglecting the fact that the work of inspections within ministries was not evaluated at that time.
Institut alternativa will continue to closely monitor the ongoing reform process of inspection supervision in Montenegro, respond promptly, provide constructive suggestions for such a serious reform, and inform the public in a timely manner.
An overview of the work of seven inspections in areas of high corruption risks represents the first attempt to systematically assess the effectiveness of the inspection oversight conducted by seven different inspections. Some of these inspections are organised within the Administration for Inspection Affairs, while others are part of sectoral ministries. However, all operate in areas with a high risk of corruption — urban planning, healthcare, employment in the public sector, allocation of budgetary funds in the public sector, and protection of state property.
The focus is on the planning of inspection oversight, its execution, and also raises important questions regarding effects, such as filed criminal reports and raised indictments, depending on publicly available information.
In the analysis we propose specific recommendations for improving the effectiveness of inspections in areas at risk for corruption, including necessary legislative changes, enhanced staffing planning, more proactive reporting, and training aligned with the practical needs of inspections.
Publication is produced within the framework of the project Inspect to Protect: Turning Inspectorates Into Anti-Corruption Allies supported by the Embassy of the United States in Montenegro, the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of the Institut alternativa and does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government.
We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are happy with it.Ok
A key change in the systemic framework is the proposal to establish a Coordinating Body for Harmonisation and Monitoring of Inspection Supervision, as a permanent working body of the government that, among other things, “coordinates the work of all inspection bodies.” The powers of the Coordinating Body for Harmonisation and Monitoring of Inspection Supervision, as outlined in the draft law, significantly exceed the nature and objectives of the powers of permanent working bodies stipulated by the Regulation on the Work of the Government. Permanent working bodies of the government include: the Commission for Political System, Internal and Foreign Policy; the Commission for Economic Policy and Financial System; the Commission for Personnel and Administrative Matters; and the Commission for the Distribution of Part of the Budget Reserve Funds.