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Public Policy School – Parliamentary Edition

Institute Alternative held another Public Policy School from September 10th to 12th at the Avala Hotel in Budva, this time for representatives of the expert staff of the Parliament of Montenegro.

The goal of our School, which we have organised in different versions since 2012, is to contribute to the quality development of public policies in Montenegro by strengthening the capacities of interested actors in policy development and increasing the understanding of policy development among key stakeholders.

In this edition, we selected representatives of the Parliament’s expert staff as the School’s participants. As the role of Parliament and MPs becomes increasingly dominant in proposing new legislative initiatives, we believe it is essential for MPs to receive support from the expert services within Parliament to better connect the world of politics with the world of arguments, facts, and evidence-based approaches to policy preparation.

The School participants went through various stages of policy creation—how to structure writing, how to set up arguments, how to identify target groups, and how to determine the best solution for a given public policy.

During the School, participants had the opportunity to explore the details of the policy cycle through practical examples and learn about the best ways to influence and prepare documents in different formats, while also going through the process of designing public policy proposals through group work.

Škola javnih politika - Parlamentarno izdanje

Public Policy School was conducted within the project „Parliament for Citizens: Accountability Redefined“ implemented by Institute Alternative and supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.

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Corruption in Public Procurement – Criminal (Non)Liability

Corruption in public procurement represents one of the highest risk areas for damage to the state budget and can occur at any stage of the process.

In the analysis “Public Procurement in Montenegro – Transparency and Liability” in 2010, we wrote that “The Police Administration independently filed only three criminal charges over a period of three years on reasonable suspicion that criminal acts of abuse of official position in public procurement procedures were committed. According to available information, no final court verdicts for criminal acts in the field of public procurement have been issued so far.” In the analysis, we also recommended that “The Police Administration and the State Prosecutor’s Office should approach the issue of identification and prosecution of criminal acts in the field of public procurement with particular attention.”

Fourteen years later, we investigated whether anything has changed, through discussions with state prosecutors, police officers, control institutions, and by collecting information on cases, indictments, and verdicts.

We analysed the period from January 2016 to July 2023, during which contracts for public procurement worth over 3.5 billion euros were concluded in Montenegro. This amount is roughly equivalent to one annual budget of Montenegro, which for 2024 amounts to 3.48 billion euros. In the publication, we provide answers regarding the reasons for the absence of criminal liability, as well as recommendations for further action.

In our new publication, we provide answers regarding the reasons for the absence of criminal liability, as well as recommendations for further action.

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10 questions for the Ministry of the Interior

In the repeated parliamentary debate on the proposal of amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, representatives of the Government of Montenegro, specifically the Ministry of the Interior, have a new opportunity to provide answers and additional explanations to the following questions:

  1. Why did the Ministry of the Interior, during the preparation of this act, fail to comply with regulations on public involvement, that is, why were there no public consultations, no invitation for representatives of non-governmental organisations to join the working group, nor a public discussion on the draft law?
  2. What could have been done in the past three years to avoid the “emergency” situation of a shortage of personnel in the police?
  3. Why, despite our numerous warnings, has the personnel plan not been adopted for four years?
  4. Is the number of systematised positions realistically planned, given that it is now over 500 more than in the systematisation plans from the period before 2020?
  5. How many job openings are truly necessary, and how many are expected to be announced by December 31, 2025, when the application of the proposed solutions expires? Have the current heads of organisational units already assessed the need for new hires?
  6. How many new employees can be trained annually, considering the available resources needed to conduct training?
  7. What is the planned structure of the members of the commission for assessing knowledge, skills, and competencies?
  8. How long will the hiring procedure take under the proposed legal amendments, considering that one of the reasons for the amendments is that the regular hiring process is too slow?
  9. What additional integrity mechanisms can the Ministry of the Interior offer to the public to dispel doubts about new political appointments through the misuse of the proposed procedures?
  10. What authorities will the newly employed staff at the Police Directorate be able to exercise (and thus what tasks will they perform) in their first year of service if they have not yet completed police training, until the training is finalised?

Answers to these questions are important, especially because these are systemic changes that did not involve the public, and the provided explanations did not address them.

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Important Laws Passing Without Public Discussion

Tomorrow, the Parliament of Montenegro will consider 8 laws that have not undergone public discussion, which continues the highly non-transparent way of preparing legislation that characterises both this Government and the parliamentary majority.

Of the laws on tomorrow’s agenda, five proposed by the Government did not undergo public discussion “due to urgency.” These are important legal texts covering areas such as concessions, energy, renewable energy sources, state property, and internal affairs. Most of these laws were not even planned in the Government’s work programme for this year (laws on internal affairs, concessions, state property). Additionally, the ruling majority’s MPs have submitted amendments to all of these laws, in some cases significantly changing the original draft proposals. Of the three legislative proposals by MPs on tomorrow’s agenda, all were submitted by members of the ruling majority, and only one has received the Government’s opinion.

The two extraordinary parliamentary sessions scheduled for tomorrow are a bad example that is increasingly becoming a practice in the legislative process. Government proposals adopted through expedited procedures and without public discussion—of the 78 Government law proposals submitted to Parliament so far, only a third have undergone public discussion.

It is, at the very least, unusual that MPs from the parliamentary majority are leading in the number of legislative proposals and that their amendments significantly alter the Government’s original draft proposals. This suggests a coordinated action between MPs and the Government to quickly pass or amend important laws, bypassing stages of the process such as public discussion, comprehensive impact assessment, alignment with the European Commission, etc.

Since the start of the 28th convocation, 131 draft laws have been submitted to the parliamentary procedure, 40% of which were submitted by MPs, primarily from the ruling majority (two-thirds of the total). Only 15% of the MPs’ laws include even an attempt at a financial impact assessment. The Government rarely gives opinions on these legislative proposals, even though the Rules of Procedure require it to do so, and has provided opinions on only one-fifth of the MPs’ proposals, almost exclusively on those submitted by the ruling majority.

The public is being actively excluded from the legislative preparation process, both by the Government ignoring this obligation and by MPs submitting legislative proposals.

The publicly voiced objections to the draft law on the use of energy from renewable sources, which require concrete answers and explanations, are proof that public and expert consultation is necessary.

Marko Sošić
Institute Alternative

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The Draft Fiscal Strategy – IA Comments and Suggestions

As part of the public debate on the draft Fiscal Strategy of Montenegro for the period 2024-2027, we submitted 10 proposals for amendments to this important document to the Ministry of Finance. This will be the third Fiscal Strategy since this instrument was introduced into the public finance system in 2014, and we have waited too long for the draft, whose content does not justify this delay. Our review of the draft Fiscal Strategy can be found here.

Proposal 1: Redefining the measure “Establishment of Financial Police”

The Fiscal Strategy is hardly the right place to promote a strategic novelty in the institutional framework for combating corruption and serious crime, especially when the rationale remains limited to a single paragraph, and the description of the problem to be solved is limited to the statement “considering the current decentralisation of institutions responsible for control in this area.” From such a vague explanation, it is unclear whose jurisdiction this new “body” would take over. It is important to note that there has been no public debate on this idea, nor has such a discussion ever taken place in parliamentary committees, government commissions, the National Anti-Corruption Council, or the National Security Council.

Regarding the idea of introducing a “tax police” into the legal system of Montenegro, it should be noted that this is not a new idea; in fact, similar proposals have appeared in official statements several times over the past five years, at least once in the context of comparisons with Italy’s “Guardia di Finanza.” A review of the development history of this institution in Italy can provide some insight into the scope and complexity of the transformation from “customs police” to “modern economic and financial police.”
Without intending to debate an idea that is neither well-explained nor justified, it is important to highlight the possibility that establishing a new special body with police powers regarding certain criminal offenses could lead to further fragmentation of the institutional framework. Additionally, there are currently no appropriate resources for staffing this body, either now or in the medium term.

It is true that the adopted Anti-Corruption Strategy includes an activity to “conduct an analysis of the need for the establishment of a financial police” between the fourth quarter of 2024 and the fourth quarter of 2025. Based on the draft Fiscal Strategy, it seems that the government is not waiting for the results of this analysis, assuming instead what its outcome and conclusions will be.

Regarding this issue, it is worth noting that since 2022, there has been an improvement in domestic and international trust in the work of the Special State Prosecutor’s Office (SSP) and the Special Police Department. In mid-2024, on the proposal of the current government, the Law on the Special State Prosecutor’s Office was amended to limit the SSP’s jurisdiction to the most serious forms of corruption and organised crime, considering the number of cases, the average duration of investigations, and the capacity of prosecutors. Given the current institutional framework and publicly available data on police staffing, there are significant structural challenges in police staffing. This was one of the reasons the current government proposed amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, along with several other challenges outlined in the report on the state of the Ministry of the Interior as of October 31, 2023, which the government adopted on November 23, 2023.

Proposal 2: Supplement the measure “Budget Inspection”

The Budget Inspection has been given a special place in the Fiscal Strategy, but only regarding a new law that is being prepared. The inspection currently operates with only one inspector, although it is responsible for four systemic laws covering the entire public sector. Despite the activities of budget inspectors in 2024 that demonstrated the importance of this body, the number of authorised positions has not changed, nor have the conditions been created to improve the financial position of inspectors to attract candidates for these positions.

It is necessary to strengthen the staffing of the Budget Inspection by amending the Ministry of Finance’s organisational rules to double the number of planned positions (from the current three) and by making additional efforts to fill these positions by increasing financial compensation for the work.

Proposal 3: Introduce a new measure: “Strengthening the Position of the Protector of Property-Legal Interests of Montenegro”

The institution of the Protector of Property-Legal Interests of Montenegro faces numerous problems in its work and is not part of any strategic document in this area. Strengthening this institution will indirectly reduce spending in the area of legal disputes, although this is only part of the solution to this problem.

Some elements of this measure could include improving the transparency of the Protector’s work through regular reporting to the government and the public on cases, providing not only statistical data but also additional information on the highest-value disputes, the dynamics of their resolution, key challenges, and the Protector’s advisory and preventive functions. This could involve launching a dedicated website for the Protector, as well as implementing the State Audit Institution’s recommendation to introduce electronic records.

It is also necessary to improve the position and powers of the Protector through legal amendments that would clarify the conditions for appointment and dismissal of the Protector and their deputies, as well as conditions for renewing their mandate. The Protector should also be empowered to issue legal opinions independently and initiate procedures regarding the constitutionality and legality of contracts submitted under the Law on State Property. Additionally, it is essential to introduce penalties for state bodies (their responsible individuals) that fail to provide the Protector with the information necessary for representing the state in legal and non-legal disputes.

Proposal 4: Ensure supervision of the application of fiscal responsibility criteria

Amendments to the Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law from 2023 transferred the responsibility for giving opinions on the determination of the application of fiscal responsibility criteria from the State Audit Institution to the Fiscal Council.
Since the Fiscal Council is not yet functional, nor is it realistically expected to be in the near future (the second attempt to appoint Council members is ongoing, with only two candidates meeting the criteria, while three members are to be elected), it is necessary to ensure that this assessment is carried out throughout the duration of the Fiscal Strategy, until the Council is appointed.

Therefore, it is essential to amend the Law and permanently regulate the responsibility for this task during the duration of this fiscal strategy. Even if the Council is completed by the end of this or next year, it cannot be expected to be operational to the extent required by the complexity of overseeing the application of fiscal responsibility criteria, for which the State Audit Institution itself needed time to prepare and create methodological acts.

Proposal 5: Introduce a new measure “Conducting spending reviews”

The constant growth of the current budget and “unproductive and discretionary” budget lines is a warning signal that the Fiscal Strategy must recognise. One way to address this problem is to introduce systematic spending reviews, focusing on legality but also on success and efficiency, due to the constant growth of the current budget and, in particular, discretionary spending items.

Given the situation of ambitious measures on the side of reducing or abolishing certain budget revenues, efforts must be made to identify savings and reallocate resources to new priorities. Spending reviews can focus on sectors (e.g., education) or specific budget lines, such as representation, vehicle procurement, items labeled “other,” etc.

Spending reviews need to be systematically integrated into the preparation of the state budget, and from them can arise the justification for amending regulations and systematising certain spending processes. Linking with the budget process would allow the recommendations from the spending reviews to be connected with fiscal management and budget planning processes, enabling verification of earmarked spending and opening space for achieving savings.

There is significant comparative experience in this area, as well as OECD guidelines, that can be used to define specific steps (developing a methodology, determining the responsibility for implementation by budget analysts within the Ministry of Finance with the possibility of forming inter-ministerial teams).

Proposal 6: Introduce a new measure “Optimisation of public administration”

The draft fiscal strategy does not address the problem of the growth of the public sector and the number of employees, which has been confirmed by official data in the Government’s public database (although it does not include forms of temporary employment, state-owned enterprises, nor is it based on reliable data from the CROO registry). The lack of work on better records, optimising the number of employees, and halting growth in all sectors poses a significant fiscal risk and must be included in the Fiscal Strategy.

A key measure in this chapter would have to be obligating the Government to reduce the number of employees across all levels of the public sector by a certain percentage, ensuring a reliable and precise database of public sector employees, monitoring changes in the number of employees in real time, and implementing systemic measures for better human resource management.

This measure, in addition to the already existing activities related to sectoral functional analyses, should include improving the system for monitoring employee performance and adopting a new Decision on mutual agreement termination of employment with severance pay, which will restart the process of reducing the public sector that was halted at the end of the previous Optimisation Plan.

Better and more accurate records of the actual number of employees through linking the CROO registry for monitoring the number of employees at the municipal level, institutions, and enterprises, as well as the state administration in terms of employees under work contracts and temporary and occasional employment contracts, is one of the measures that should be included. Strengthening human resource planning at the central level, with improved updating of the central personnel records and enhanced oversight from personnel records, are also some of the necessary measures.

Proposal 7: Introduce a new measure “Rationalisation of the use of service contracts”

It is necessary to implement a systematic measure to address deficiencies in how public bodies use service contracts and temporary work agreements, which have become an increasing burden on the state budget.

Budget requests from spending units do not include analyses and justifications of the needs and expected effects of engagements through fixed-term contracts. There is no methodology for calculating the provision of budget funds by the Ministry of Finance that would prescribe assessments of the long-term impact of new hires on the budget. When approving the annual budget, the Ministry of Finance does not have all the information necessary for deciding on the number and value of fixed-term contracts (service and temporary work contracts) that are to be signed. There are no systemic controls in the hiring process (both for fixed-term and indefinite employment) to prevent an employee who receives severance pay (based on a mutual agreement on termination) from finding employment in the public sector again before the expiration of five years or returning the received severance money.

Furthermore, there are no unified rules and procedures regarding the engagement (selection) of individuals through contracts, the amount of compensation, contract duration, reporting on the work performed, required professional qualifications, etc. Service contracts and temporary work agreements are even signed for positions that are systematised, contrary to the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees. There is no practice of preparing reports on the completion of tasks under service contracts or temporary work agreements. It is not possible to have a clear analysis of the total costs for engagements through service and temporary work contracts. Expenses under these contracts are recorded under various budget positions. There is also no comprehensive record (database) of service and temporary work agreements, nor is there adequate oversight and control of the implementation of these contracts by the contracting authorities or the agencies for which the contracts were made.

All of this leads to a constant increase in costs, with an unacceptably poor or non-existent record of the value received for the money spent and significant opportunities for abuse.

Proposal 8: Introduce measures to increase the efficiency of trials for criminal offences under the jurisdiction of the Special Prosecutor’s Office / Higher Prosecutor’s Office according to the amendments to the Special Prosecutor’s Office Law

Efficient trials, or trials within a reasonable timeframe, are a prerequisite for issuing final verdicts, which in turn are necessary for the permanent confiscation of property gained through criminal activities. To make trials more efficient, there is a need for more judges in the special department of the Higher Court, more courtrooms, better trial organisation, and improvements to procedural norms to prevent abuse and delays in proceedings. Over the past three years, there has been no progress in these areas. There are neither more judges nor more courtrooms, nor has there been an acceleration of judicial proceedings. It is necessary to prepare an action plan, under the jurisdiction of the Government or the Assembly, to increase the number of judges at the Higher Court in Podgorica, improve spatial capacities, and propose corresponding amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code.

Proposal 9: Introduce a new measure “Optimisation of the state’s vehicle fleet”

There is no unified policy for the procurement and use of official vehicles, and the prioritisation of procurement is poorly defined, leading to significant and inefficient budget allocations for this purpose. According to the Ministry of the Interior data from February 2024, 4,658 vehicles are registered as state property, which is 377 more than in 2022, or 85 more vehicles than in 2020. At the same time, poor practices from the past continue regarding the regulation of vehicle use: there is no unified oversight of vehicle use (GPS tracking), provisions defining engine capacity relative to the rank of the official using the vehicle are still in effect, the circle of individuals entitled to 24-hour use of official vehicles remains unchanged and too broad, allowing for loose interpretations by institutions, while oversight is non-existent.

It is necessary to improve the management of existing official vehicles owned by the state as part of general efforts to optimise spending, eliminate unproductive privileges for management in this area, and enhance oversight of both the vehicle procurement process and their use.

Proposal 10: Introduce a new measure “Strengthening budget transparency”

The draft strategy does not address the problem of a lack of budget transparency. Montenegro ranks 64th out of 125 countries on the budget transparency index in the official global ranking by the Open Budget Survey. In the region, only North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have performed worse than us—other countries in this regard are ahead of us. Montenegro scored 48 out of a possible 100 points in the survey, indicating significant shortcomings in access to budget data.

Creating a citizen-friendly budget, preparing a semi-annual budget execution report to be submitted to the Assembly, providing non-financial data on the achievement of goals and indicators in the programme budget, and establishing mechanisms for public participation in budget preparation are just some of the recommendations that need to be fulfilled for Montenegro to improve its score.

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Postponing to the point of meaninglessness – how the control function of the Parliament collapses by untimely holding of the voted control hearings

Today, the Security and Defence Committee holds a control hearing of the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior on the following topic: “Appointment of the acting Director of the Police Administration and the consequences on the security system in Montenegro.”

The decision to hold the hearing was voted unanimously more than four months ago, and the session date was scheduled according to the availability of government representatives. It was canceled twice due to their obligations.

By holding the control hearing more than four months after it was voted on, during the regular session of the Assembly, the chairman, and members of the Security and Defence Committee allow the undermining of this oversight mechanism. In the case of this Committee, it is not only a procedural but also a legal obligation, as their oversight role is additionally strengthened by the 2010 Law on Parliamentary Oversight in the Field of Security and Defense.

The scheduling of the session can be a matter of agreement between the chairman of the Committee and government representatives, but within reasonable limits that do not undermine the purpose of the initiative. The obligation to coordinate is not prescribed, and according to the Rules of Procedure, communication with the government in this sense is not within the jurisdiction of the chairman of the Committee. Formally and legally, the Committee is not obliged to coordinate with the Government obligations, as they “invite government representatives to the session” when they decide to schedule it. According to the current chairman of the Security and Defence Committee, the Committee is left at the mercy of the government regarding the scheduling of the session — if the government representatives had said they would not come, he never would have scheduled it.

This information is particularly concerning given that similar situations occur with voted hearings in the Committee on Economy, Finance, and Budget, that in several committees the right to minority initiative for control hearings is being suppressed, reports from deputies that the government does not respond to their questions and requests for documentation, or that the Prime Minister dictates when the Prime Minister’s hour can and cannot be held…

Therefore, it is up to the leadership of the Parliament, from the President to the chairmen of the Committees, to ensure the protection of the constitutional position of the Assembly, the spirit of the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, and the Law on Parliamentary Oversight in the Field of Security and Defense. The majority deputies should also beware – tomorrow they might be in the opposition benches, and the principled fight for a meaningful oversight role of the Assembly might be of matter to them.

This infographic was prepared within the project „Parliament for Citizens: Accountability Redefined“ implemented by Institute Alternative and supported by the National Endowment for Democracy. The infographic is the sole responsiblity of its authors and does not reflect the views of the NED.