Only three ministries announced public discussions for this year

More than a half of the ministries have not published the work programme for the current year in accordance with the law, while only three ministries have published a list of laws and strategies to be subject of public discussions in 2021.

This year, the ministries continued the bad practice of not publishing their work programme, as well as the list of acts to be subject of public discussions during the year.  Thus,  the adequate conditions have not been created for involvement of citizens in policy- making processes. When it comes to the public participation in policy-making, this Government has made a step forward by including the public in the process of preparation of the Government’s Work Programme. The Institute Alternative has advocated this for many years.

At its  17th Session, held on 30th March this year, the Government of Montenegro adopted the Work Programme for the current year. Although the third quarter is coming to an end, by 29th September, more than a half of the ministries have not published the work programme in accordance with the obligation from the Law on State Administration. Out of 12 ministries, only five of them fulfilled this obligation – Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Human and Minority Rights, Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports. Only few days ago, Ministry of Defence also published its work programme.

On the website, the Ministry of Ecology, Spatial Planning and Urbanism and Ministry of Economic Development have published only their three year work programme for the period 2019-2021.

The bad practice continued when it comes to the publishing acts on which a public discussion will be initiated during the year. The Decree on the Selection of the Representatives of NGOs in Working Groups and Implementation of Public Discussions on the Draft of the Laws and Strategies stipulates the obligation of the ministries to post on their websites and e-uprava portal lists of draft laws and strategies to be subject of public discussions at the latest 15 days after the adoption of the work programme.

On this date, only Ministry of Justice, Human and Minority Rights, Ministry of Ecology, Spatial Planning and Urbanism and Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports published the list of documents to be subject of public discussions in 2021. We came to this data by an advanced search conducted concluding with  28th September.

During this mandate, the Government has submitted 48 draft proposals to the Parliament so far, and for only six of them the public discussion was held.

We remind that the Government stated in its Work Programme that the basic principles in the future policy planning and planning of the work are to set transparency and openness to citizens in order to encourage discussion on key priorities and directions of public policy development.

By not publishing the work programme and list of the acts for public discussion, interested public can not to get acquainted with plans and responsibilities of the ministries in a timely manner. This is the first prerequisite for consulting the public. Ministries should enable meaningful civic participation, through timely announcement of public discussions whose implementation is expected during this year.

Dragana Jaćimović
Project Associate

Analysis of parliamentary work during the first year of the 27th convocation

Greater transparency; legislative and control roles need enhancement

During the first year of the current convocation, Parliament has considerably opened its work, but also engaged in legislative activity which was not grounded in sound analysis and legally predictable procedures. Control mechanisms have not been used to push conclusions and tangible recommendations for the executive.

  •   Greater transparency and normative changes

Live streaming of the work of parliamentary committees, which was the IA’s frequently voiced recommendation, and launching of parliamentary channel on the public service broadcaster are important milestones in transparency of the Parliament’s work, but also indirectly, in empowerment of citizens who now have easier access to important discussions on public policies.

The late 2020 Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament have also created preconditions for strengthening the control role of the Parliament. Among other things, there is an opportunity for a more frequent use of the so called “minority initiative“, according to which one third of the committee members may initiate control hearings on certain issues two times during the Parliament’s regular session. Moreover, parliamentary committees were explicitly tasked to monitor implementation of conclusions, adopted as a result of hearings. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure have also ensured representation of women and minority parties at Parliament’s vice-presidential positions. The Women’s Club was established in March, as an informal parliamentary body aimed at gender-mainstreaming of decision making at all levels. According to the published information, the Women’s club had two sessions so far. A working group was also formed for drafting the Law on the Parliament. However, after the initial session, there were no significant changes in the work on this act, whose finalisation was initially planned for October 1, 2021.

  •   Legislative activity: No necessary analysis and equal participation

The kick-off of new convocation was marked by the intensification of the legislative activity of Members of Parliament (MPs). For the first time in several decades, MPs have overtaken the Government in the number of legislative proposals: they have submitted 49 out of a total of 97 legislative proposals that have entered the parliamentary procedure in the past year. However, this trend is not accompanied by elaborate procedures, which would provide the necessary data and inclusiveness of the law-making process. Legislative proposals, proposed by the Government, are regulated and, as a rule, accompanied by ex ante regulatory impact analysis, public consultations and debates, and participation of NGOs in working groups. Although these Government’s procedures are implemented with many impediments, they are not elaborated at the level of the Parliament. The chairs of the committees arbitrarily decide whom to include in the law-making process. External actors do take part in the work of the Parliament regarding legislative proposals, but the lack of clear criteria and procedures leads to unequal treatment of individuals and organisations. The most drastic example was inability of representatives of the Montenegrin Ortodox Church to take part in the work of the Committee on Human Rights and Freedoms during discussion of the amendments to the Law on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Legal Status of Religious Organisations.

The adoption rate of the legislative proposals, initiated by the opposition, has been very low so far. Only one Law, on elimination of the consequences of the confiscation of Valdanos area, was adopted, upon the initiative of Genci Nimanbegu, the opposition MP.

The amendments of MPs were also marked by numerous controversies. They often distort the spirit of law in question. Amendments to the regulations on labor and internal affairs, which lowered the retirement age and directly exposed appointment of police director to the undue political influence, serve as a warning for better justification and wider deliberation of the amendments, filed by MPs.

  •   Control mechanisms without “epilogue”

The occasional boycott of the Parliament by the Democratic Party of Socialists from the opposition, but also by the Democratic Front, a key constituent of the parliamentary majority, has affected the quality of its work. Parliamentary committees have not performed “at full speed”.  On average, 11.7 sessions per committee was held, which is slightly more than one session per month. In quantitative terms, the most active was the Committee on Political System, Judiciary and Administration with 24 sessions, and the most passive was the Committee for Anti-Corruption with only 3 sessions.

Parliamentary committees held 11 consultative and 9 control hearings, and 3 of them were delayed. The two thirds of all control hearings were held by the Security and Defense Committee. Only two reports on control hearings provided concrete conclusions and recommended actions to the executive bodies, whose representatives were summoned. One of the key reasons is that the subjects of control hearings were at the same time addressed by judiciary or that they included secret documents.

The committees discussed 49 reports on the work of institutions. Unlike previous years, 44% of the considered reports was not adopted (22 of them). However, there were mostly no concrete conclusions and recommendations which would improve the situation in certain areas based on the reported state of the afafirs. Only following the five reports which were adopted by the Committee on Human Rights and Freedoms, concrete conclusions tacking the details of the work of competent institutions, were adopted.

Until September 2021, MPs have posed more parliamentary questions (261) than during the whole of 2020 (213), when intensity of the work of the Parliament was reduced due to the outbreak of coronavirus epidemic. The two so-called “ministerial hours” were held, after this new institute had been introduced by amendments to the Rules of Procedure in December 2020. The Minister of Health and the Minister of Foreign Affairs answered questions regarding the topics of immunisation against coronavirus and the diplomatic-consular network. Unlike in previous years, during 2021, the opposition was more active than the parliamentary majority in asking parliamentary questions: 51% of questions were asked by representatives of the opposition parliamentary clubs. The quality of responses to MPs’ questions varies. MPs often warn of the Government’s delays in providing the requested information. Control function of parliamentary questions is undermined since the Government does not always comply with the obligation to provide MPs information they require with their regular performance of parliamentary duties, within the prescribed deadline of 15 days. Consequently, they are often forced to repeat requests for those information through parliamentary questions.

Milena Muk

Institute Alternative

Open Letter to the European Union

To the:

Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union
President of the European Council, Honorable Mr. Charles Michel
President of the European Union Commission, Honorable Ms. Ursula von der Leyen
President of the European Union Parliament, Honorable Mr. David Maria Sassoli
High Representative/VP, Honorable Mr. Joseph Borrell
Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Honorable Mr. Oliver Varhelyi

15 September 2021

Request from specialised Western Balkans Civil Society Organisations for their formal participation in the new Western Balkans Investment Framework’s good governance mechanism

Honorable EU Representatives,

The EU Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans (EIP) aims to support the post-pandemic recovery of the region and its economic convergence with the EU, to contribute to the building of a Regional Common Market and to make possible for the regional economies to take a stronger position in the European value chains, thus directly contributing to the EU’s strategic autonomy in the long term.

Up to EUR 30bn will be the financial muscle put at the service of recovery, economic development, and green transition in the WB6 for the next seven years, out of which EUR 9bn will be IPAIII funded grants provided by the EU.

To be delivered through the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF), this amount represents a qualitative jump in the financial assistance to the region towards a project- based development model that goes in parallel with countries’ reforms.

But while the WBIF governance is being updated to reflect IPAIII requirements, WB6 homegrown problems that directly impact the successful preparation, implementation and operation of EIP flagship projects are dealt with only partially.

No remedies are proposed to deal with identified WB6 structural weaknesses such as low involvement of local authorities, capacity constraint at beneficiary level, or change of governments and subsequent alteration of political will required to push forward with the implementation of EIP flagship projects. Issues falling in the category of Fundamentals, such as corruption and conflict of interest, public procurement and rule of law do not figure in the framework factors conditioning the delivery of EIP.

At the 23rd (WBIF) Steering Committee meeting of December 2020, the need for specific EU conditionality regarding the EUR 30bn disbursement has been partially acknowledged through the obligation for accompanying reforms. However, no specific benchmarks, neither any information about the “carrot and stick” mechanism applying to EIP project financing has been provided.

The welcomed WBIF focus on the project “eligibility criteria” rightly brings into the limelight the quality of National Sector Strategies and of Sector Project Pipelines and the administrative capacity of WB6 administrations. But the proposed EU technical assistance falls short of dealing with good governance challenges affecting the preparation phase, where the most important challenge is integrity compliance and political will.

Also, while the emergence of connectivity initiatives around the world is also being felt in the WB6, the increasing presence of third actors in the peninsula does not appear in the WBIF risk list either.

In the region we are witnessing parallel prioritisation pipelines: one that produces the mature projects as per the EU methodology, and other ones that prioritise and finance infrastructure projects through alternative mechanisms and criteria different and unrelated to EU’s.

Infrastructure project governance is the soft underbelly of EU Enlargement in WB6: if designed wrongly, it can derail the whole economic conditionality as embedded into the Economic and Reforms progress of the WB6 countries. Wrong infrastructure prioritisation can affect country’s mid-term economic projections; financial overstretch in project financing and any resulting liabilities will impact the 3-year budgetary plans, and; corruption in public works will endanger the structural reform agendas.

But what is even more important, when we talk about good governance in infrastructure projects, we are talking about the practical and tangible implications of the rule of law in the everyday life of WB6 citizens.

In the new Enlargement methodology, the progress achieved in the Fundamentals cluster, conditions the advancement of negotiations in the Transport, Energy or Digital chapters, and is reported as such. But in the case of EU supported infrastructure initiatives such as in the EIP, the WB6 citizens will not need to consult the yearly EU country reports to learn about the adoption of the acquis or progress of reforms, and how they may impact their life. They will assess infrastructure’s utility immediately because they will use it (or not) every day.

How to effectively embed accountability in the EIP so that it protects the interests of EU taxpayers, of IFI shareholders and of WB6 citizens all by making it compliant to IPAIII requirements?

We believe that when dealing with hybrid states, the active participation of specialised CSOs and think tanks in the EIP good governance mechanisms, practically and immediately contributes to the correct handling of the structural weaknesses of WB6 institutions.

Specialised WB6 CSOs and think tanks have regularly produced since 2015 high quality monitoring assessments and analyses on the impact and challenges of the Connectivity Agenda (CA) projects. They have brought their unique knowledge of local context and their expertise in producing concrete proposals of how to improve CA governance.

By intervening into the way WB6 infrastructure is planned, implemented and operated WB6 specialised think tanks and CSOs are trying to bridge the democratic deficit in policy making, all by contributing to the efficiency of how EU taxpayer’s money is spent in our region.

The phenomena of policy capture, embezzlement, abuse of functions, trading in influence etc., have been identified as direct causes for misallocation of state revenues, wastage of resources, inflated prices, reduced quality, and negative impact on environment, health, and safety of WB6 citizens. By participating in policy-making and project implementation, WB6 CSO and think tanks directly represent and defend the WB6 citizens’ interest.

In June 2021, the consequences of special laws drafted to contract infrastructure projects in Serbia or in Albania, political prioritisation of highway tracks in Kosovo, alternative national project pipelines in Montenegro, low quality of infrastructure project preparation in North Macedonia, environmental impact in Bosnia and Herzegovina, substantial use of Public Private Partnerships and change of project parameters in Albania have all been dissected, debated, discussed and resulted in policy recommendations during the Civil Society Forum (CSF) “Road to Berlin”.

For those WB6-wide policy recommendations to not remain paper exercise, we have decided to formally request for the specialised CSO and Think Tanks to become part of the new EIP delivery mechanism. Given the weight of the sovereign-backed loans in the EIP financing and taking into account the “structural weaknesses” of WB6 administrations in charge, the CSO participation in the good governance mechanisms of EIP and 10 Flagship projects will definitely contribute to its transparency and accountability.

In the spirit and the letter of inclusive partnership principle as figuring in the Regulation of the EU Parliament and of the Council establishing the IPAIII, First Reading, we believe that this is an appropriate situation where the EU can ensure that relevant stakeholders of beneficiaries such as civil society organisation are duly consulted, have timely access to information that allows the said CSOs to play a meaningful role during the design, implementation and associated monitoring process of programs.

Based on our expertise, experience, local knowledge, knowledge of EU programing, and building on the policy recommendations CSF of Western Balkans Summit in Berlin 2021, we kindly request that:

  • the appropriate and adapted transparency and accountability mechanisms to EU and to WB6 taxpayers must be embedded into the new WBIF good governance mechanism. They should cover all the stages of project-cycle from identification to operations included;
  • the new WBIF governance mechanism must create space and the right conditions for the WB6 specialised CSOs and Think Tanks to formally contribute into its good governance throughout all the EIP policy-making components and flagship project phases. The role of civil society should be enhanced also in programs and actions implemented through responsible institutions and government bodies, and not only as a direct beneficiary of EU assistance.

Honorable EU Representatives,

Through this open letter we are kindly requesting for formal participation of CSOs in the national and WBIF’s programming and implementation cycle, through appropriate mechanisms, to obtain the best value for money for the benefits of our citizens.

WB6 CSO-s Open Letter to the EU Institutions available here

Prepared in Belgrade, Podgorica, Prishtina, Sarajevo, Skopje, and Tirana
(Follows list of signatories up to 15th September 2021)

1. Krisela Hackaj, Executive Director at Cooperation and Development Institute – Albania
Contact: Krisela.hackaj@cdinstitute.eu

2. Ana Krstinovska Blazheska, President and Founder at ESTIMA Institute – North Macedonia
Contact: krstinovska@estima.mk

3. Jelica Minic, President at European Movement Serbia – Serbia
Contact: jelica11746@gmail.com

4. Stevo Muk, President of the Managing Board at Institute Alternative – Montenegro
Contact: stevo@institut-alternativa.org

5. Marko Troshanovski, President at Institute for Democracy – North Macedonia
Contact: marko@idscs.org.mk

6. Mexhide Demolli Nimani, Executive Director at Levizja FOL – Kosovo
Contact: mexhide@levizjafol.org

7. Aleksandar Macura, Co-founder, Programme Director at RES Foundation – Serbia
Contact: macura@resfoundation.org

8. Vesna Bochvarska Cvetkovska, Co-founder, Financial Director at Center for Change Management – North Macedonia
Contact: vesna.bochvarska@cup.org.mk

9. Dimitar Nikolovski, Executive Director at Center for European Strategies Eurothink – North Macedonia
Contact: dimitar.nikolovski@eurothink.mk

10. Sonja Licht, President of the Foundation BFPE for a Responsible Society – Serbia
Contact: slicht@bfpe.org

11. Ornela Liperi, Editor in Chief, Monitor magazine – Albania
Contact: ornela.liperi@monitor.al

12. Aleksandra Tomanic, Executive director, European Fund for the Balkans
Contact: aleksandra.tomanic@balkanfund.org

13. Gjergji Vurmo, Program Director, Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) – Albania
Contact: gevurmo@idmalbania.org

14. Valmir Ismaili, Executive Director, Democracy Plus – Kosovo
Contact: valmir@dplus-ks.org

15. Aranita Brahaj, Executive Director, Albanian Institute of Science (AIS) – Albania
Contact: aranita.brahaj@ais.al

16. Rezarta Krasniqi, Executive Director, Democracy for Development (D4D) – Kosovo
Contact: rezarta.d@d4d-ks.org

17. Arjan Dyrmishi, Executive Director Center for the Study of Democracy and Governance – Albania
Contact: adyrmishi@csdgalbania.org

18. Naim Rashiti, Executive Director, Balkans Policy Research Group (BPRG) – Kosovo
Contact: nrashiti@balkansgroup.org

19. Leila Bicakcic, Executive Director, Center for Investigative Reporting (CIN) – Bosnia and Herzegovina
Contact: leila@cin.ba

20. Marija Risteska, Executive Director, Center for Research and Policy Making – North Macedonia
Contact: risteska@crpm.org.mk

21. Srdjan Blagovcanin, Chairman, Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina (TIBiH) – Bosnia and Herzegovina
Contact: sblagovcanin@ti-bih.org

22. Zorana Marković, Executive Director, Centre for Development of Non-governmental Organizations – Montenegro
Contact: zorana.markovic@crnvo.me

23. Nemanja Nenadić, Program Director, Transparency Serbia – Serbia
Contact: ts@transparentnost.org.rs; nemanjalaw@orion.rs

Instead of unnecessary acting positions, ensure compliance with the law

“Ad hoc“ and unregulated competitions for acting positions in ministries unnecessarily postpone lawful recruitments and reduce managerial accountability in ministries. „Acting managers“ are more susceptible to influences due to insecurity of their position and employment.

These competitions are currently announced for 20 acting general directors in the Ministry of Finance and Social Welfare. Earlier, they were also announced by the Ministry of Public Administration, Digital Society and Media and the Ministry of Capital Investment.

The first question that arises is why these ministries did not fulfil their legal obligation by creating conditions for the implementation of the legally prescribed procedure for conducting a public competition. The law does not recognise the institute of “competition“ for acting positions, but only the procedure of public competition for heads of administration bodies and senior civil service, which includes general directors and secretaries in the ministries. The acting positions are filled for the maximum period of six months, and thus represent transitional solutions until the full appointment.

By having unnecessary acting positions, senior civil service is further destabilised and vulnerable to politicisation, despite the Government’s warnings from February 2021 that “a significant outflow of experts from the negotiating structure can negatively affect on dynamics of fulfilling obligations from the EU negotiation process“.

Government has only adopted partial workforce plan at the end of July this year. Despite all the delays in the adoption of the budget and reorganisation of public administration, this document did not include 21 administration bodies and four ministries for internal affairs, defence, finance and social welfare and education, science, culture and sport. On the other hand, the law prescribes that only those positions envisaged by the workforce plans can be filled in regular recruitment procedures. As a result,  senior civil servants in institutions, not covered by the workforce plan, cannot be recruited according to the procedures of the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees, which encompass public competition and assessment of skills and competencies.

Instead of working on workforce planning and more stable senior civil service positions, some ministries have announced competitions for acting positions. These competitions are announced even 10 months after the formation of the Government, serving more as an indicator of poor management than alleged transparency and openness. These personnel solutions are temporary, so resources should be used for finding more permanent solutions, in full mandate and in accordance with the law.

Transparency is also questionable, because the protection of personal data of candidates who participate in a legally unregulated procedure is a very sensitive topic. Confirmation of this is the fact that besides aggregate information on the number of candidates, applied for the acting positions in the Ministry of Public Administration, Digital Society and Media, no more information about these competitions had been disclosed.

We also point out that the recently adopted partial workforce plan is not of better quality from the previous plans. No justification for planned recruitment of 139 employees was provided. This way the Government confirmed that for now it is not ready to use the institute of workforce planning as a mechanism of much-needed optimisation of public administration.

Milena Muk

Institute Alternative

 

 

EU as a promoter of democracy or ‘stabilitocracy’ in the Western Balkans?

Starting from August 2021, the Think for Europe Network (TEN) commenced its work on the research project “the EU as a promoter of democracy or ‘stabilitocracy’ in the Western Balkans?”. This project is implemented in partnership with the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’.

Through its enlargement policies the EU tries to foster democratisation in the Western Balkan region. Now that further reforms in a number of countries only progress slowly or seem even deadlocked, more and more attention is being paid to the negative side-effects of EU policies. The literature on EU enlargement notes that, in spite of their democratic objectives, EU strategies and policies unintentionally contribute to the formation of so-called stabilitocracies in the region: countries with obvious democratic shortcomings that at the same time claim to provide pro-EU stability.

The research project focuses on the six countries of the Western Balkans. For each country, it assesses how flaws in the EU’s enlargement policies as identified in the literature play out in practice by offering a reflection on the applicability of the theoretical framework for the specific country, underpinned by an assessment of a number of case studies.

The project will be carried out throughout 2021 and will culminate in a Clingendael report in English with 6 contributions from TEN partners, one for each country of the Western Balkan Six.

This project is financed by the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.

TEN members are organisations recognised for their achievements in the field of public policy research and their experience and capacities in terms of advocacy:

European Policy Centre (CEP) from Belgrade
Institut Alternative (IA) from Podgorica
European Policy Institute (EPI) from Skopje
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) from Tirana
Group for Legal and Political Studies (GLPS) from Pristina
Foreign Policy Initiative BH (FPI) from Sarajevo

Political bias can only be determined in a legally prescribed procedure

We urge the Government to refrain from political discrimination and unlawful decision-making.

Termination of employment due to expression of political beliefs in performance of work may follow only after the disciplinary procedure and corresponding justification, which we did not see in the decision of the General Secretariat of the Government published in the media.

Regarding the news that the employee in the General Secretariat of the Government was handed a decision of termination of employment due to expression of political beliefs in performance of work, we note that this kind of serious violation of official duty can be determined only within the legally prescribed procedure.

According to the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees, the expression of political beliefs in performance of work is a serious violation of official duty and it can be determined only in disciplinary proceedings, on the initiative of the immediate supervisor or the head of the body.

We have sent a request for free access to information to the General Secretariat of the Government asking an insight into the decision on initiating disciplinary proceedings and the imposed disciplinary measure, alongside the already published decision on termination of employment.

In case that this procedure was not conducted, we note that the decision of termination of employment is not legally grounded and that it opens the door to suspicion of political discrimination. The decision of termination of political employment, which we have seen in the media, contains only a general reference to the Law, without specifying the facts and circumstances.

Institute Alternative has previously warned that principle of political neutrality of civil servants needs streamlining, especially given the wide spread practice that civil servants are simultaneously councilors of political parties at the local level.

However, our initiative was not accepted at that time, while the current Government also failed to prioritise better normative solutions  preventing undue political influence on public administration.

Milena Muk

Institute Alternative