The Draft Law on the National Security Agency is a step backward in terms of judicial oversight, employment, and public procurement.
There is no justified reason for the Draft Law on the National Security Agency (ANB) to be rushed through parliamentary procedure in just a few days, without any prior debate or consultation. This is especially troubling given that the draft contains numerous serious shortcomings — further restricting judicial oversight of the Agency’s powers, fully exempting it from the public procurement system, and introducing complete discretion in hiring.
Montenegro’s experience with its security services has been difficult and painful: human rights violations and abusesfor which former ANB officials are now on trial, numerous revealed scandals, and others that remain insufficiently investigated. Yet, none of this prompted the Government of Montenegro to act responsibly and open a broad, transparent public discussion — to explain the reasons for adopting this law, the objectives it seeks to achieve, and the rationale behind specific legal provisions.
It remains unclear who authored this draft law, when and with what intentions it was written, and whether it was consulted with any international organizations or enjoys EU support. This is not merely a matter of national security — it is also a question of human rights, merit-based employment, and accountability toward other branches of government.
The draft law would make an already isolated state institution, one with very limited oversight, accountability, and transparency, even more closed off — further removing it from the legal system and reducing external control and responsibility.
Under the proposal, all ANB procurements, including those unrelated to national security, would be exempt from public procurement regulations. Instead, they would follow internal procedures determined solely by the Agency’s Director. This would eliminate the current system of differentiated procedures and create room for non-transparent, discretionary spending without external oversight — a serious regression in terms of legality and fiscal accountability.
When it comes to judicial control over ANB powers, the draft law represents a major step backward. It does not improve upon the problematic provisions regarding court authorization and supervision of ANB powers — issues previously raised by us and other civil society organizations. Of particular concern is that, contrary to the Constitution and international human rights standards, the draft grants ANB the authority to access written and electronic records held by state bodies, public administration, local governments, legal entities, and other subjects without a court order; to secretly collect data on users’ electronic communications, including traffic and location data, as well as records of unsuccessful communication attempts; and to inspect information and communication systems of state and local authorities without judicial oversight.
While the current law states that employment within ANB may be established without public advertisement, the draft law explicitly states that employment is established without public advertisement. Thus, what was once an optional practice — unfortunately often abused — is now explicitly required, making public recruitment impossible. Unlike modern intelligence services in democratic countries, ANB would therefore not employ staff through open competition, leaving the hiring process entirely discretionary and merit-free. The draft law also omits the existing provision requiring proportional representation of minorities in recruitment.
We also note that the current law obliges ANB to report to the Council for Defense and Security, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, in accordance with the law. The draft, however, stipulates only that “when required by national security interests, the Agency shall inform state bodies and administrative authorities of data relevant to their competence.”
Such wording represents a clear weakening of accountability and further reduces transparency and inter-institutional oversight of one of the most powerful institutions in the country.
Stevo Muk
President of the Managing Board