Invoking the protection of “circumstances of individual cases” cannot serve as a basis for the prosecution to entirely refuse parliamentary oversight. The applicable legal framework and established practice indicate that the Supreme State Prosecutor (SSP) and the Chief Special Prosecutor (CSP) are required to respond to invitations from competent parliamentary committees and participate in their work when matters within their remit are being considered, except where this could compromise the effective conduct of criminal proceedings.
During 2025, a public debate emerged between the Supreme State Prosecutor and the Parliament of Montenegro regarding the SSP’s obligation to respond to invitations from parliamentary committees, as well as the scope of information to be provided to Members of Parliament. The dispute primarily concerned the interpretation of the Law on the State Prosecution Service and the Rules of Procedure of Parliament, particularly with regard to the protection of “circumstances of individual cases” and the Parliament’s oversight function.
The Law on the State Prosecution Service stipulates that, at the request of Parliament or its working bodies competent for judiciary, anti-corruption and security matters, the Supreme State Prosecutor and the Chief Special Prosecutor are required to:
- submit special or periodic work reports within the deadlines set by Parliament or the competent body;
- participate in parliamentary sittings, as well as meetings of competent committees and of inquiry committees when these reports are being considered, except where this concerns the circumstances of individual cases.
Following consideration of the submitted reports, or in the event of their non-submission without due justification, Parliament or the competent committee may forward opinions, assessments, proposals and recommendations to the Prosecutorial Council and the Minister of Justice. Full compliance with the Law on the State Prosecution Service requires the competent committee to formally request a special report from the Supreme State Prosecutor. In 2024, the Law on the State Prosecution Service was amended, including the provision on cooperation with Parliament, which had given rise to interpretations that the Supreme State Prosecutor was obliged to participate in parliamentary work even in the absence of a prior request for a report. The amendments clarified that such participation is linked to the consideration of reports previously requested by MPs.
The Parliamentary Rules of Procedure also provide for consultative hearings as a mechanism for exercising parliamentary oversight over bodies that, under the law, submit work reports to Parliament. The State Prosecution Service falls within this category.
In earlier parliamentary practice, the Supreme State Prosecutor and the Chief Special Prosecutor regularly participated in the work of parliamentary committees upon invitation. Previous Supreme and Chief State Prosecutors, as well as the current CSP prior to the appointment of the current SSP in January 2024, took part in control hearings and committee sittings. Moreover, in 2023, heads of other prosecution offices and state prosecutors also participated in committee work, even in the absence of an explicit legal obligation.
It is true that the Law on the State Prosecution Service explicitly requires only the Supreme State Prosecutor and the Chief Special Prosecutor to participate in committee work; however, earlier practice reflects a broader understanding of the prosecution’s accountability to Parliament. At the same time, in the interest of sound institutional communication and strengthening public trust, the Supreme State Prosecutor and the Chief Special Prosecutor could have accepted committee invitations and provided written or oral explanations within the limits prescribed by law. In particular, in cases of significant public interest, the Supreme State Prosecutor is not restricted from presenting a consolidated chronology of prosecutorial actions without disclosing information that could jeopardise the proceedings.
The notion of “circumstances of individual cases” should be interpreted narrowly, rather than being used by the Supreme State Prosecutor as justification for fully restricting information on case handling. Such a narrow interpretation refers to data whose disclosure could jeopardise criminal proceedings, including ongoing or planned procedural actions, hinder the identification of perpetrators, or compromise the protection of personal and business data, such as personal information, family circumstances and business secrets.
It should be noted that the SSP and the CSP face no legal obstacle to informing MPs, in general terms, about actions taken, such as hearings, expert examinations or international requests for mutual legal assistance, without disclosing identities of individuals involved or the substance of those actions. This approach is consistent with the Law on the State Prosecution Service, which provides that, when informing the public about a specific case, only information on actions taken or underway may be disclosed, without revealing the identities of participants or the substance of those actions. Information that could affect the conduct of proceedings may not be made public. This provision is already applied in press releases and media statements. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that MPs are entitled to at least the same level of information as that available to the general public under the law.
In all cases of particular significance and of public and parliamentary interest, the SSP and the CSP have both the right and the obligation to communicate the findings arising from their oversight. This includes providing assurances that they have reviewed the work of the acting prosecutor and established that the case is being handled within statutory deadlines, or indicating that proceedings are exceeding legally prescribed time limits for reasons known to the competent authority and considered justified. The SSP and the CSP may also inform MPs of their professional assessment of expected timelines for decision-making in such cases, including the factors on which those timelines depend.
Transparent and timely communication between the Supreme State Prosecutor, the Chief Special Prosecutor and Parliament, within the limits of the law, can strengthen public trust in the work of the State Prosecution Service and help reduce institutional tensions. As the body that appoints the Supreme State Prosecutor and a portion of the members of the Prosecutorial Council, Parliament has a legitimate interest in obtaining basic information on the handling of cases of particular public interest, provided that this does not jeopardise criminal proceedings.
Obligations do not rest solely with the Supreme State Prosecutor and the Chief Special Prosecutor, but also with Members of Parliament. Invitations to prosecution leaders should be exceptional and based on well-founded reasons. The Code of Ethics of Members of the Parliament of Montenegro requires MPs to perform their duties exclusively in the public interest, conscientiously and responsibly, and in accordance with rules on the prevention of conflicts of interest. Accordingly, when inviting the Supreme State Prosecutor and the Chief Special Prosecutor to participate in committee discussions and when adopting conclusions, MPs must refrain from participating in discussions or decision-making on matters in which they, or persons connected to them, have a personal or private interest. Adherence to these ethical standards is a precondition for credible and legitimate parliamentary oversight, as well as for maintaining institutional balance and public trust in the work of Parliament and the State Prosecution Service.
Stevo Muk
President of the Managing board
The analysis was prepared within the framework of the project “Fostering Public Debate and Improving the Quality of Public Discourse in the Legislature,” implemented by Institute Alternative with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The analysis is the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the National Endowment for Democracy.