Last week’s amendments proposed by the Government to the proposed Law on Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs introduce several improvements. However, the draft law still contains controversial provisions, as does the proposed Law on the National Security Agency.
We recall our key objections to the earlier versions of the draft amendments, which we continue to consider problematic.
The draft law still provides that the Commission for Security Obstacles, appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, consists of five members: three police officers, one employee from the organisational unit for internal control, and one employee from another organisational unit. We believe that it is necessary to stipulate that the three members of the Commission who are police officers should be appointed upon the proposal of the Director of the Police, in order to ensure that the majority of members are appointed upon the proposal of the Police Director, who is a professional.
The provisions on conducting security vetting have been partially clarified with regard to the grounds for determining the existence of a security obstacle. However, the proposal still retains the solution whereby the officer is informed of the existence of a security obstacle, but not of the reasons on the basis of which it was established. We recall that the procedure for determining security obstacles is still not regulated within our legal system. Such provisions do not exist in the Law on the National Security Agency, nor is there a separate law regulating this procedure. Unlike, for example, the Republic of Croatia, which has a specific law — the Security Vetting Act — Montenegro does not have a solid legal basis for conducting security vetting.
The provision extending the deadline for recruitment under a special procedure until the end of 2027 is in direct contradiction with the Operational Conclusions of the Special Working Group for Public Administration Reform between Montenegro and the European Union, adopted in November 2025. The joint document contains operational conclusions to be fulfilled by the end of the third quarter of 2026 as part of the benchmarks for closing Chapter 23 in the area of public administration reform. One of the conclusions states that Montenegro will ensure merit-based recruitment and selection of candidates in the state administration, inter alia by “ensuring transparency and availability of data on the number of decentralised recruitments, particularly in accordance with the Law on Internal Affairs, and re-establishing centralised recruitment in this area.” From the above, it clearly follows that extending the duration of the special recruitment procedure directly affects the fulfilment of the benchmarks under Chapter 23.
The draft Law on the National Security Agency still provides that public procurement rules will not apply to any procurements carried out by the NSA — including those that are not of a security nature — but that only internal procedures determined by the Director of the Agency will apply. This abolishes the existing system of differentiated procedures and opens the door to non-transparent, discretionary spending without external oversight, representing a serious step backwards in terms of legality and fiscal accountability.
With regard to judicial oversight of the powers exercised by NSA officers, this draft law represents a major step backwards. The proposal does not introduce improvements regarding the problematic issues of judicial oversight and the authorisation of the use of powers, which we have previously highlighted together with other non-governmental organisations.
While the current law stipulates that employment in the NSA may be established without public advertisement, the draft law explicitly states that employment shall be established without public advertisement. In this way, what was previously a possibility — which unfortunately was not used in practice — is now explicitly precluded. As a result, unlike modern intelligence services in developed countries, the NSA will not recruit through public competitions, thereby keeping the recruitment process within the scope of discretionary decision-making on grounds that do not necessarily have to be merit-based.
We also note that the current Law prescribes the obligation of the NSA to report to the Defence and Security Council, the Minister of Defence, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Montenegro, in accordance with the law, which we consider to be a better solution. The draft law instead provides that “when required by reasons of national security, the Agency shall report to state authorities and state administration bodies on data relating to their competences.”
Stevo Muk
President of the Managing Board