The work of inquiry committees in the Parliament of Montenegro is burdened by a series of procedural and legal gaps that make them an inefficient and easily obstructed mechanism of parliamentary oversight. The applicable Law on Parliamentary Inquiry does not clearly regulate the deadlines for deciding on initiatives, the replacement of committee leadership, the obligations of summoned persons, the planning of work, or the publication of documentation. As a result, parliamentary inquiries are often reduced to politically performative hearings, lacking a clear strategy, an analytical approach, continuity, full public insight, and effective consequences. As a first step, the Parliament should amend the Law on Parliamentary Inquiry and prescribe clear rules, deadlines, obligations, and sanctions, so that parliamentary inquiries produce facts, accountability, and recommendations, rather than merely media effects.
Fourteen years ago, the Parliament unanimously adopted the Law on Parliamentary Inquiry, which has never been amended, and has yielded very modest outcomes: two inquiries, the “Telekom” affair in 2012 and the “Snimak / Recording” affair in 2013, were finalised through the adoption of technical reports, with no institutional repercussions; since 2020, ten initiatives to open a parliamentary inquiry have been considered, four have been adopted, but only two inquiry committees have been formed so far, neither of which has completed its mandate.
A key shortcoming of the Law on Parliamentary Inquiry is its failure to set out a clear procedure or deadline for electing a new chair and deputy chair when the mandates of the current officeholders expire. Consequently, the ongoing inquiry into the “Black Troikas” has been stalled for months, following the resignations of the committee’s chair and deputy chair.
An additional problem is the absence of effective sanctions for failing to respond to an inquiry committee’s summons, refusing to give testimony, or providing false testimony. Individuals summoned before an inquiry committee are not legally obliged, nor subject to sanction, to appear and testify fully and truthfully. The recent refusal of the former President of Montenegro, Milo Đukanović, to testify before an inquiry committee illustrates how limited the committee’s powers are when no clear legal consequence exists for such conduct.
The Law on Parliamentary Inquiry does not require the adoption of a work plan for the inquiry committee. In practice, such a document is neither prepared as part of the decision to open a parliamentary inquiry nor developed during the committee’s work. A plan of this kind could specify which individuals will be heard, which documentation will be requested, and allow for adjustments as the inquiry progresses. Preparing such a plan would help articulate a clearer work strategy, enhance the preparation of committee members, and ensure more effective oversight of the inquiry’s progress.
A further concern is insufficient transparency. The Parliament’s website does not contain systematically published documents related to the work of inquiry committees. Minutes of sessions, statements of summoned persons, decisions of the inquiry committee, and documentation submitted to the committee, whether upon request or proactively, are not available. Although inquiry committee sessions are public and streamed on the Parliament’s YouTube channel, publishing the relevant documentation would ensure greater transparency of the committee’s work, enable independent analysis of the material, and improve the quality of public information.
A further notable gap is the lack of a defined timeframe within which the Parliament is required to act on an initiative to open a parliamentary inquiry. For instance, the draft decision to open a parliamentary inquiry and establish an inquiry committee to gather information and facts on the actions of state authorities in relation to cigarette smuggling in Montenegro, submitted by members of the parliamentary majority, has remained in procedure for more than a year, since March 2025.
All of the above points to the need for the Parliament to consider amendments to the Law on Parliamentary Inquiry, which has remained unchanged since its adoption in 2012. The following areas should, ideally, be prioritised:
- introducing sanctions for failing to provide information and documentation to the inquiry committee;
- introducing sanctions for refusing to appear when summoned, declining to give testimony, or providing false testimony before the inquiry committee;
- requiring the publication of documents related to the committee’s work, including minutes, reports, statements, decisions, and documentation submitted to the inquiry committee;
- setting a deadline within which the Parliament must decide on an initiative to open a parliamentary inquiry;
- clarifying provisions governing the procedure for appointing a chair and deputy chair of the inquiry committee in the event of their resignation or termination of office;
- requiring the adoption of a committee work plan, including an indicative list of hearings, documentation to be obtained, and institutions from which information will be requested.
Without these amendments, parliamentary inquiries will continue to have limited reach: they may highlight important issues, but will not produce answers, provide a coherent account of the facts, or lead to accountability and institutional conclusions. For inquiries to operate as a credible oversight mechanism, the Parliament must strengthen their rules, powers, and transparency.
The analysis is prepared within the framework of the project “Fostering Public Debate and Improving the Quality of Public Discourse in the Legislature,” implemented by Institute Alternative with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The analysis is the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the National Endowment for Democracy.