Institute Alternative submitted an initiative to the Ministry of Justice proposing amendments to the Constitution of Montenegro in the part relating to the position and competences of the Prosecutorial Council, with the aim of strengthening its independence, accountability, and balance within the state prosecution system.
Institute Alternative calls on the Ministry of Justice to seriously consider these proposals in the process of planned constitutional amendments, bearing in mind the recommendations of the Venice Commission, international standards, and experiences from domestic practice.
Institute Alternative believes that constitutional amendments are necessary in order to:
- strengthen the non-prosecutorial component of the Prosecutorial Council’s membership,
- require an absolute majority of MPs for the election of distinguished legal experts,
- prevent the concentration of managerial and supervisory power in one person,
- and clearly define the obligation of the Prosecutorial Council to ensure the legality of the prosecutorial function.
The objective of the proposed amendments is not to weaken the prosecution service, but to strengthen its institutional accountability and public trust in its work.
The initiative proposes:
- Removing the constitutional provision under which the Supreme State Prosecutor chairs the Prosecutorial Council ex officio, as well as reconsidering their membership in that body, due to the evident conflict of interest and concentration of power.
- Introducing the obligation that members of the Prosecutorial Council be elected by a majority vote of all MPs, instead of a simple majority, in order to ensure broader political consensus.
- Supplementing the Constitution to clearly prescribe that the Prosecutorial Council “ensures that the prosecutorial function is performed in accordance with the Constitution and the law,” in line with previous recommendations of the Venice Commission.
- Establishing a balanced composition of the Prosecutorial Council by strengthening the rights of non-prosecutorial members regarding access to information, oversight of prosecutorial work, and the initiation of procedures for determining responsibility.
Conflict of Interest and Concentration of Power
The constitutional arrangement under which the Supreme State Prosecutor simultaneously manages the State Prosecutor’s Office and chairs the Prosecutorial Council creates a systemic incompatibility of functions. The person responsible for ensuring the legality of prosecutorial work simultaneously leads the body that is supposed to oversee that work.
Institute Alternative points out that after the appointment of the new Supreme State Prosecutor in 2024, positive oversight practices weakened or became ineffective.
Earlier Warnings of the Venice Commission
As early as 2007, during the drafting of Montenegro’s Constitution, the Venice Commission suggested that the role of the Prosecutorial Council should also include oversight of the legality of prosecutorial activities. It also warned of the risk that prosecutors within councils could vote “as a bloc,” following hierarchical instructions, which could weaken the supervisory function of that body.
The Venice Commission emphasized that a Prosecutorial Council without a strong and genuinely independent component cannot serve as an effective mechanism for controlling the power of top prosecutors.
Risk of a Closed Decision-Making System
Institute Alternative warns that the 2024 amendments to the Law on the State Prosecutor’s Office further strengthen the dominant position of prosecutors within the Prosecutorial Council and its commissions, thereby deepening institutional imbalance.
Such a structure creates the risk of corporatism — a closed decision-making system characterized by strong internal solidarity and limited external oversight. Although prosecutorial autonomy is essential for protection from political influence, international standards clearly require that it be balanced with accountability, transparency, and effective oversight.
Stevo Muk
President of the Managing Board